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The purpose of this thesis is to examine the
factors affecting the repatriation of Afghan refugees
living in Pakistan, by using data collected in these refugee
camps, during the Fall of 1988.
Refugees are generally defined as those people fleeing
their country out of fear of persecution or physical injury
from forces within their country. The flight into or out of
a country, by refugees, can be seen as a special type of
migration or population flow.
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The initial model of population flows was developed by
Ravenstein (1885).

Migrations and decisions to migrate were

measured along a simple linear continuum of pluses and
minuses.

If more pluses then minuses were present, movement

(migration) occurred.

This model was applied only to

migration and never applied directly to refugee flight or
refugee repatriation.
Ravenstein's model of migration has since been
elaborated into a model of "pushes" and "pulls" (Lee 1966).
Donald Bogue's work, Principles of Demography,

(1969),

identifies such "push" factors as decline in national
resources, loss of employment, oppressive treatment of
political, ethnic, and religious minorities. Catastrophes
such as fire, flood and drought are also considered "push"
factors.
A more complete model, and the first one applicable to
refugees' flows, is the Process Model of Egon F. Kunz
(1981).

Kunz identifies two types of factors; a home

related dimension and a host related dimension.

Kunz,

however, only discusses the flow from the home country to
the host country and does not apply his model to
repatriation.
Data for this thesis was collected through one hundred
interviews, conducted in Pakistan, during the Fall of 1988.
These interviews provided information regarding the
background of the refugees, their previous condition in
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Afghanistan and their new lives in Pakistan.
When the refugees were asked why they originally left
Afghanistan, 28 percent answered simply, "Because of the
Russians."

Twenty-one percent replied, "Because of

communism and its opposition to Islam."

Twenty percent

said, "Because of invasion and the war" and 24 percent
answered, "Because of the fighting and the attacks."

Only

four percent of the refugees claimed to have left because
they had either been put in jail or were threatened with
being jailed.
In trying to determine certain factors that could
either block or encourage repatriation, the refugees were
asked a series of questions about whether they thought they
would return under certain situations.

The first of these

questions was, "Will you return before the Russians leave
Afghanistan?"
not.

An overwhelmingly 99 percent said they would

When asked if the refugees would return if the parties

or Mujahideen were fighting for power among themselves, 60
percent answered, "No" and 20 percent answered, "Yes, they
would go back to try and stop the fighting."

Eighteen

percent insisted, "The Mujahideen and the parties would not
fight among themselves as long as there was an Islamic
government."
Many Afghans have been seriously injured by antipersonnel mines planted in Afghanistan.

When asked if they

would return before the mines were removed, 65 percent said
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they would not, while 32 percent said they would go back,
that it was their duty to help remove the mines.
The factors that were found to affect willingness to
return under these various conditions included; number and
age of dependents, time in refuge, geographic distance
travelled, economic opportunities in Pakistan, minority
group membership, and fear for future personal safety.
The best general description that can be made about the
Afghan flight and possible repatriation, and all refugee
flights, is that it is a process or cycle encompassing two
countries and the interplay of factors or "pushes" and
"pulls" between them.
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CHAPTER I
STATEMENT OF PROBLEM
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the
factors affecting the repatriation of the Afghan refugees
that were living in Pakistan in 1988 by using data collected
in the Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan in the fall of 1988.
The analysis should be understood in the context of the
conditions existing at the time the data were collected.
The most important conditions included the presence of the
Soviets in Afghanistan, the belief that a Soviet withdrawal
would result in an immediate collapse of the Communist
regime in Kabul, and the possible return of King Zahir Shah.
This thesis will examine major factors that help explain why
some refugees say they will return while others say they
will not.
DEFINITION OF REFUGEE
Refugees are usually defined as those people fleeing
their country out of fear of persecution or physical injury
from forces within the country.

The 1951 convention on

protocol of the United Nations, adopted by the United
Nations High Commission on Refugees, classifies a refugee as
follows:
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Any person who owing to a well founded fear of
being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion, is outside the country
of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such
fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the
protection of that country; or who, not having a
nationality and being outside the country of his
former habitual residence, is unable, or owing to
such fear, is unwilling to return to it (United
Nations 1951).
MODELS OF POPULATION FLOWS
The flight into or out of a country by refugees can be
seen as a special type of migration or population flow.

The

initial model of population flows was developed by
Ravenstein (1885).

Migrations and decisions to migrate were

measured along a simple linear continuum of pluses and
minuses.

If more pluses then minuses are present, movement

(migration) occurs.

This model was applied only to

migration and never directly to refugee flight or
repatriation.
This first work of Ravenstein was based on the British
census for 1881.

In 1889, Ravenstein wrote a second paper,

based on data from more than twenty countries.

The laws

put forth by Ravenstein may be summarized thusly: 1.
Migration is usually only a short distance, i.e., the
further the distance the less the number of migrants; 2.
Migration is usually in stages, i.e., those close to a large
city will migrate to it when economic opportunity warrants,
and those in more rural areas will fill their places; 3.
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There are streams and counter streams in migrations; 4.
There are urban and rural differences in propensity to
migrate, i.e., rural populations are more likely to migrate
than are urban populations;
predominantly female,

5. Short distance migrants are

i.e., in short distance migrations

females tend to outnumber men;

6. The development of

technology tends to promote greater rates of migration;

7.

Economic factors tend to dominate motives for migration,
i.e., many factors can cause migration, but the most
important is the desire for people to improve the economic
situation (Ravenstein 1885, 1889).

Initially Ravenstein was

criticized for presenting work that would in fact seem to
support the idea that migration was lawless, or that
Ravenstein had formulated his laws in such a way that they
could not be criticized (Lee 1966, pp. 47-48). Despite the
original criticisms of Ravenstein's laws and the subsequent
criticisms that have followed in the last one hundred years,
Ravenstein's work remains the basic foundation of all work
that was to follow.
The model of Ravenstein has since been modified into a
model of migration based on not a "plus/minus" scheme but a
"push/pull" process.

This "push/pull" process was

elaborated by Everetts. Lee (1966).

Lee used the push-pull

process in his work on the concept of intervening obstacles
and their effect on migrations.

Lee's formulation showed

migration to be a result of "pushes" and "pulls" or
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"attractions" and "repulsions" at both the origin as well as
the destination; these pushes and pulls included such
factors as climate, good schools and taxes.

Lee also

identified the effect of intervening obstacles, such factors
as geographic distance or physical obstacles.

Lee went on

to note that it was difficult to identify exact factors for
any given person (Lee 1966).
Donald Bogue's work, Principles of Demography,

(1969),

identifies such "push" factors as decline in national
resources, loss of employment, oppressive treatment of
political, ethnic, and religious minorities, and
catastrophes such as fire, flood and drought.

He also

expanded the list of "pull" factors to include superior
opportunities for employment, preferable environment and
living conditions, and dependency of persons to whom one is
related.
A more complete model, and the first one applicable to
refugees' flows, is the process model of Egon F. Kunz
(1981).

Kunz's model recognizes the importance of numerous

dimensions in factors affecting refugee flows.

Kunz

identifies two types of factors, a home related dimension,
and a host related dimension.

Kunz, however, only discusses

the flow from the home country to the host country and does
not apply his model to repatriation.
In one of the most complete works on factors affecting
refugee repatriation, Joshua Akol (1987) described a number
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of specific social factors as influencing the rate of return
among the Sudanese population.

These included the economic

situation in the home country as well as the political
situation and how they affected the refugees' desire to
return.
Other research has identified other aspects affecting
repatriation.

Jeff Crisp identified the importance of time

as an intervening variable in his study of African refugees
(July 1987).

Sidni Lamb identified the importance of

economic considerations in the return of Ethiopian refugees
(1986).

Richard Lawless and Liela Monihan, in their work on

Moroccan refugees, showed the importance of human rights
considerations and their effect on return (1987).

Stephan

Keller and his work on the partition of India shows how
ethnic and religious conflicts can precipitate a massive
migration (1975).
THE PROCESS MODEL OF KUNZ
The Process Model of Egon F. Kunz (1981) is useful in
that Kunz breaks down factors into both a home related
dimension and a host related dimension.

The factors that

Kunz identifies in the home related category are as follows:
the identification of the refugee with other groups in the
country; the attitude of the refugee in flight; and the
ideological national orientation abroad of the refugee.
The identification of the refugee with other groups in
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the country can be broken down into three categories.

The

first is "The Majority-Identified, those refugees who are
firm in their conviction that their opposition to the events
is shared by the majority of their compatriots."

Secondly,

Kunz identifies "The Events-Alienated, those who either
because of events immediately preceding the refugee
situation, or because of past discrimination are ambivalent
or embittered towards their compatriots."

Thirdly, "The

Self-Alienated, those who, for varied individual reasons or
philosophies have no wish to identify with the rest of the
nation" (Kunz 1981, pp. 42-43).
When Kunz considers the attitude of the refugee towards
flight he identifies two different attitudes.

The first is

the "Reactive Fate Group;" these are the refugees of wars,
sudden revolutionary changes and expulsions.

Secondly, are

the "Purpose Groups;" the Purpose Groups are identified as
usually being makers of their own situation in that they may
espouse "a certain facet of belief or ideology or a form of
society that is in opposition or inconsistent with the
majority society" (Kunz 1981, pp. 44-45).
Next, Kunz identifies the orientation of the refugee in
exile which he terms "Ideological National Orientation in
Exile."

The orientation includes six basic types:

"Restoration Activists," those who want to restore their
nation to the previous situation;

"Passive Hurt," those who

retire resigned to the situation;

"Integration Realists,"
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those realizing the reality of the situation and seek
integration; "Eager Assimilationists," those who to escape
guilt hyperactively seek assimilation; "Revolutionary
Activists," those who turn their energies to preparing a
revolution which would change the government and lifestyle
in their homeland; and "Founders of Utopias," those who turn
their backs on the host society and form ideologicallyinspired idealist colonies (Kunz 1981, pp. 45-46).
Finally, Kunz identifies factors in the host country
which impact resettlement in the host country.

One host

factor is cultural compatibility, including such areas as
language, values, tradition, religion, politics, food and
interpersonal relations.

Another host factor is government

policies toward immigrant populations.

The two types of

policies Kunz identifies are: "Augmentative," in which "the
host societies are likely to look at the refugee as a sought
after and valued immigrant who is expected to contribute to
the nation's numerical growth and its economic capacity,"
(Kunz 1981, pg.48) and secondly "Self-sufficient,"
identified as
demographically self-sufficient countries which
are less likely to accept large numbers of
refugees. Because they are not particularly
anxious to retain and assimilate new arrivals they
are less likely to press the refugee to abandon a
home orientated outlook and activities (Kunz 1981,
pg. 48).
Finally Kunz considers attitudes of the host society
towards refugees.

He identifies three attitudes: "Monastic-
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assimilationist," "Pluralistic-integrationist," and
"Sanctuary societies-tolerant" (Kunz 1981, pg. 47).
"FACTORS AFFECTING REFUGEE FLOWS
While Kunz's scheme is ambitious and very descriptive,
it does not address the issue of repatriation in a
satisfactory way.

For example, it considers factors to be

different between the home country and host country.

Based

on the previous models of migration and the factors
identified by refugee writers, similar factors can be
identified in both the host and home country (Bogue 1969).
By considering factors in the home and host country as
falling into generally similar spheres it is easier to
predict flight, resettlement, and possible repatriation.
When looking at refugee flows and the factors affecting
them, one finds a patterning among types of factors.

The

types of factors are (1) political issues (Akal 1987, Bogue
1969); (2) geographic obstacles (Lee 1966); (3) human-rights
and safety concerns (Bogue 1969, Lawless and Monihan 1987);
(4) social, culture, ethnic, or religious issues (Bogue
1969, Keller 1975); and (5) economic concerns or
opportunities (Akal 1987, Bogue 1969, Lamb 1986).

These

factors must be considered in both the host country of
refuge and the home country (Bogue 1969, Kunz 1981).
must be considered when looking at refugee flows and
possible refugee repatriation.

Both
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Factors in the political sphere which may provoke
flight include war, invasion, civil war, and changes in
government.
1987~

These would all be factors causing flight (Akol

Bogue 1969).

Refugees fleeing these conditions would

be a part of a reactive fate group (Kunz 1981).

These same

factors, if causing a flight, must be addressed for a return
to occur.
Geographic obstacles such as rivers, mountains, oceans,
and distances are all factors that affect flight as well as
return.

These may be identified as intervening obstacles

(Lee 1966).
In the human rights sphere factors include torture,
murder, illegal detention and repression of countries'
citizens, whether by their own government and people or by
outside forces.

Refugees fleeing these conditions would

also be identified as members of a reactive fate group (Kunz
1981).

Again, these factors must be addressed in the home

country for a full and voluntary repatriation to take place.
In the socio-cultural sphere conflicts arise among
groups of people due to tribal affiliation, ethnic heritage,
language or religious preference (Bogue 1969, Keller 1975).
And finally, in the economic sphere there are a number
of factors.

These are natural disasters, such as floods,

droughts, epidemics and pestilences (Bogue 1969).

And then

there are those economic conditions that are man-made.
made economic factors may be purposeful or unintended.

Man-
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Theft of government funds and inappropriate use of funds are
just as devastating to a country as when its economy is run
by inept and untrained people (Akol 1987).
The various factors that have been previously described
have positive and negative effects.

This means that events

such as civil war, torture or starvation are factors that
will repel a group of people whether at home or in a host
country.

This is a negative force or a "push" (Lee 1966).

Events such as the end of a civil war, the ouster of a
brutal regime, economic development or aid are all positive
and have a positive value; this is a "pull" (Lee 1966) and
will draw people back.

Often just the removal of a negative

factor, such as a civil war, is a positive charge to draw
the refugees home.

When a refugee flow is precipitated,

there is often some strong negative "push" such as civil
war, or economic deprivation, or ethnic strife.
The choice of the refugees' asylum is determined first
by geographic consideration, such as being the nearest
country.

The nearest country would have the strongest

positive "pull" in the geographic sphere.

However, the host

government's treatment and policies about refugees can be
positive or negative (Kunz 1981).

Other considerations are

cultural compatibility and economic opportunity.
Most often refugees leave with some crisis
precipitating the flow.

For instance, economic hardship and

ethnic conflict may have been tolerated for some time, but
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with the outbreak of civil war the refugee decides it is
finally time to leave.
"push"

combined with some sort of "pull" from a host

country in
country.

There usually has to be some strong

order to get a refugee to leave his or her home

Most people are extremely resistant to having to

leave their country.

Once the refugee flow has taken place

and refugees are in a host country,

the decision to return

is based on what factors have been addressed in the home
country that caused the refugee's flight, as well as the
"pulls" to remain in the host country.
For example, if there has been a civil war and an
oppressive government that has driven refugees to a host
country, and they are supported in that host country in a
humane and dignified way, there will be little impetus to
return home until the factors causing flight in the home
country have been resolved.

The factors that "pulled" a

refugee to the host country may be strong enough to keep him
or her there even though conditions in the home country
improve.
In many of the repatriation flows, not only were there
strong "pulls" to return home from the host country, but
often there have been simultaneous "pushes" to leave a host
country.
Many cases show that time becomes more important as
more of it passes (Crisp, July 1987).

The longer the

refugees are out of their country, the greater the chance
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they will be assimilated into the host country.

In turn,

the greater the assimilation, the less the chance they will
return home.

Another consideration of time is that the

longer the refugees are out of their country, the greater
the chance that their means of support in their home country
will disappear (whether it is the fields and irrigation
systems of farmers being ruined, or someone's job
disappearing, or a business being left unattended),

and the

greater the likelihood they will be made into economic
refugees.
When considering a model of factors in refugee flows,
the spheres of factors can be arranged in order of their
degree of impact based on whether the factor is a crisis to
react to, such as a political coup or human rights abuses,
or a more long term problem such as economic problems and
socio-cultural conflicts.
Time should be considered in several different ways.
One way is the time it takes the various factors to occur
and be resolved.

At the top of the hierarchy of factors is

the political sphere.

Coups and civil wars can erupt in

days or hours and, just as quickly, be resolved.

Human

rights abuses take more time to develop as a problem to
which citizens react.

They probably will not leave at the

first sign of abuse, but as the abuse continues they are
forced to flee for their own safety.
longer to address as well.

These abuses take
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The socio-cultural conflicts take even longer to
develop, often generations, and can cause very deep rooted
and long term resentment and hostilities that will take
decades to

overcome.

Finally, economic hardships can result from war or
corruption or simply be faults or flaws in the
infrastructure of the home country that may have been
developed over generations.

A ruined economy, depleted

natural resources, or severe drought or other natural
disaster cannot be made up for over night.

Economic

problems may take the longest to resolve and are often the
hardest to solve.
In addition, the more time that passes after a
precipitating crisis, such as a coup, without a consensual
resolution, the greater the chance that the refugee will be
affected in other spheres.

For instance, what starts out as

a political crisis and drives refugees out of the country,
if allowed to continue long enough, will result in economic
hardship.

Aging of the refugees and changes of family

structure will also occur over time.
THE WORLDWIDE REFUGEE SITUATION
If history tells us one thing it is that repatriation
is the exception instead of the rule in refugee flows.
Pakistan, Israel, and the United States of America, among
many nations, are all the result of extensive flows that
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will never result in repatriation.
neither want it nor seek it.

The persons involved

There are, however, many

refugee flows that have resulted in repatriation.
By looking at the factors that affect refugee flows and
the role these factors play in subsequent repatriation of a
refugee population, it is possible to predict the outcome of
current or future flows.

The following sections will first

focus on the literature that identifies these factors.

Past

and present refugee flows will be addressed to determine
what these factors are.
Secondly, models of migrations will be presented and
used as a foundation from which to work.
of Egon F. Kunz, Everett

s.

The previous work

Lee, and Donald Bogue will be

addressed and incorporated into the description of the
process.

The general hypotheses derived from the literature

will then be tested against the information I collected
during my interviews of Afghan refugees who fled to
Pakistan.
The following section on examples of refugee flows is
based on work which I originally presented in 1988, in a
report called "Factors Of Repatriation: The Return to
Afghanistan," whose chief authors were Grant Farr and John
Lorenz.
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NORTH AFRICA
Algeria is a good example of a simple refugee flow that
was followed shortly afterwards by repatriation of virtually
the entire refugee population.

The Independence War that

rocked Algeria in 1960 was enough to set off a refugee flow
which resulted in over 200,000 fleeing over Algerian borders
into Tunisia and Morocco (Crisp, July 1987).
The two major factors which accounted for this flow
were, first, the political issue of the war and, second, the
issue of human rights and a fear for personal safety.
fear of war pushed the refugees out of Algeria.

The

This would

be an example of a reactive fate group, in that they fled
due to a war (Kunz 1981, pg. 44).

They fled to two of the

nearest countries which had cultures and customs similar to
Algeria.

This would be considered a "host related factor of

cultural compatibility" (Kunz 1981, pg. 47). The refugees
who fled were only out of their country for a short time
(two years), insuring that little assimilation into the host
country took place.

Because of the short time, time did not

become a intervening variable (Crisp, July 1987).

With the

arrangement of the cease fire in 1962, virtually all the
refugees spontaneously returned to Algeria (Crisp, July
1987) .
Because little assimilation took place, because the
time involved was so short, and the primary factor (a war)
was resolved, repatriation took place.

In other words, the
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"pulls" home overcame the "pushes" that had kept people from
returning, and movement occurred (Bogue 1969, Lee 1966).
The Afghans, in comparison, have been assimilated to a high
degree in Pakistan, and, even though the Soviets have left,
and the communist government has collapsed, sporadic
fighting continues,

thus little repatriation has taken

place.
In the case of the Western Sahara and Morocco, human
rights dominated the situation.

For the people of the

Western Sahara the decision by Morocco to invade and
actively oppress the local population in the 1980's was the
driving force causing the refugees to flee to the
neighboring country of Algeria.

In all, a total of over

200,000 ended up fleeing Morocco into Algeria (Lawless and
Monihan 1987).

Morocco is maintaining its policy of

oppression and kidnapping, which has so far insured that no
repatriation has taken place.

These refugees also would

fall under the definition of being reactive fate refugees.
In the above situation, the same factors that had
originally driven the refugees out, human rights issues and
harsh political treatment, continue.

There is no

indication, at this time, that any changes will occur.

In

fact the recent discovery of oil deposits in the area will
surely exacerbate the problem.

The "pushes" that drove the

refugees out continue, with no counteracting "pulls" to
bring them back.

Hence no repatriation has taken place.
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The situation in Morocco is similar to the Afghan
situation in that most of the same factors - war, opposition
to communism, and harsh political and human rights
situations - remain.

The factors that pushed the Afghans

out remain, and the refugees remain in host countries.
MIDDLE EAST
Lebanon currently has one of the most chaotic refugee
situations in the world.

What has taken place in Lebanon

cannot even be considered a civil war in the true sense of
the word; gang wars may be a truer representation.

This

situation is further complicated by the Israeli-Arab
conflict.

Because of the armed violence and continued

threat to life, there are Palestinian refugees internally
and Lebanese refugees externally totaling somewhere around
263,000 (Barnes 1985).

The Palestinian refugees would be

considered "The Majority-Identified, in which their
opposition to the events are shared by the majority of their
compatriots" (Kunz 1981, pg. 42).

The Lebanese would

probably fall into two categories, "The Majority-Identified
and Events-Alienated, because of events prior to the refugee
situation or past discrimination, are ambivalent or
embittered in their attitude to their former compatriots"
(Kunz 1981, pg. 42).

Because of the continuation of the

strong negative factors there has been no return as of yet.
Here, like Afghanistan, threat of physical violence is a
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very strong deterrent to return.

These refugees would also

be classified as a reactive fate group.
AFRICAN REFUGEE FLOWS
Uganda has a tragic history of suffering and terror
dating back through the last two decades.

While Idi Amin

holds a special place in the world's memory for flagrant
human rights abuses, Oboto, upon deposing Amin, was only
more discreet, but certainly no less brutal.

Estimates of

murdered Ugandans for the three years before Oboto's removal
in 1986, range anywhere from 500,000 to 2 million.

The

Ugandans would be considered a reactive fate group.

For the

past 20 years in Uganda, each successive leader has
brutalized his tribe's ethnic enemies.

The Ugandans would

be a combination of the majority-identified and the eventsalienated (Kunz 1981).

Even the latest revolutionary

president, Mesevini, has not been able to halt this type of
terror.

When this is combined with the economic chaos and

damaged infrastructure of the country, it is remarkable that
anyone is left in Uganda.

Those who have fled have gone to

the Sudan, Kenya and Rwanda.
fled to the nearest countries.

Not surprisingly, the Ugandans
It appears that Ravenstein's

first law of "migration and distance" would apply in that
they fled to the nearest countries (Ravenstein 1889).
These countries also are culturally compatible,
providing further "pulls" (Bogue 1969, Lee 1981).

Because
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of the ongoing civil war, plus outside intervention (as in
the case of Tanzanian forces aiding in the return of Oboto
in 1982), coupled with an undisciplined and unrestrained
army, ·the once extensive plantations of coffee, pineapple,
and tea have been ruined.

Uganda's once extensive tourist

trade is completely destroyed.

It is safe to say that

Uganda has no economy other than at a subsistence level.
The economic situation in the home country can provide a
"push" to keep people from returning (Akol 1987).
Therefore, repatriation has been questionable, at best,
in many cases.

During 1983, refugees in the Yei River

district from the Sudan returned despite continuing battles
within earshot of many of the refugee camps.

One 21 years

old returnee explained that he would return despite threats
from the military:
I will not forget the hard times in the Sudan.
I
have gone hungry for a long time.
In the
settlements I have been laboring for food, now I
feel it is unbearable. So I decided to
repatriate. Quite a many people had died and I
fear I would die since the medical services are
not quite adequate (Harrell-Bond 1986, pg. 167).
It would appear that one set of fears about threats to life
and health may outweigh others.

The Ugandans who have fled

into the Sudan have for the most part been kept in camps
with no real opportunity for work or assimilation into the
local economies.

This has certainly provided a "push" to

leave the host country.

This might be an area where Kunz's

scheme would benefit from expanding his list of host related
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factors to include a population policy of what I term
"separatist/non-tolerant."

Unfortunately the vast majority

of refugees fleeing undeveloped countries flee to
neighboring countries which neither can afford nor want them
to be assimilated.

For the Ugandans the chronic problems

that they have suffered will indicate how, over time, one
problem leads to another.
In Uganda what began as an oppressive and badly run
government slowly translated into ethnic conflicts as first
one tribe and then another gained control of the government.
Each successive wave of refugees meant that crops were
neglected, stores were closed, and all commerce ceased.
Even those refugees who wish to return under the newest
government and its promises for the future would find no
effective economy and very little food.
The Ugandan crisis is especially significant in its
similarities to the Afghan situation.

In both cases the

overthrow of a government resulted in harsh human rights
violations.

In both cases a long term conflict has meant

extensive damage to the economic infrastructure, and in both
cases the violence and damage have been so extensive people
are afraid to return.
ASIAN REFUGEE FLOWS
Burma saw over 17,000 of its citizens flee to Thailand
as a result of the Civil War between the government and
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guerrilla forces.

The majority who fled did so simply due

to a well founded fear for their lives.

This would

undoubtedly be considered a human rights situation resulting
from a political confrontation (Kumin 1987).

Because of the

continuing armed strife people don't want to return.

This

is a strong, negative push in the political sphere and human
rights sphere, which, in turn, pushes returnees away. These
refugees are an example of a "Reactive Fate Group" (Kunz
19 81 ' pg . 4 4 ) .
Burma is a good example to compare Afghanistan to in
that it illustrates what happens to refugees when an armed
struggle between the government and guerilla forces is
ongoing.
Another example is Laos, which has a refugee flow made
up of those fleeing the continuing civil war and the human
rights issues involved in it.

The Laotians would be

considered a "Reactive Fate Group" (Kunz 1981, pg. 44).

In

addition, due to the Civil War, economic opportunities were
extremely limited, causing many to flee for hope of a better
economic situation.

Many have fled, some even repeatedly,

to Thailand in the hopes of better economic opportunities
{Crisp, September 1987).

This is a case where the economic

situation in the home country has provided a "push" out of
the home country (Akol 1987). The return to Laos was
initiated by an end to hostilities, tight restrictions on
economic opportunities in Thailand, as well as U.N.H.C.R.

22

assistance for those who return.

(Naef 1987).

So for the Laotian refugees, the original reasons for
flE~eing

(the civil war and the poor economy) had been

addressed by the ending of the war and by provision of some
aid from the U.N.H.C.R.

The forces that had originally

forced the refugees out (pushes) had been removed and
positive forces (pulls), to draw the refugees back, had been
put in their place.

The Thai government was providing a

strong push for refugees to repatriate with its limiting of
economic opportunities.

The Laos refugee situation is the

reverse of the Afghan situation.

The reasons pushing

refugees out of Afghanistan have not been resolved, nor have
the Afghan refugees been pushed out of Pakistan.

Not

surprisingly, there has been very little impetus for the
Afghans to return home.
Vietnam's recent armed conflict and oppressive regime
have resulted in flows into Thailand and Cambodia totaling
onE~

million (U.S. Committee for Refugees 1985).

This is the

result of a strong negative push to leave the country, in
the area of political and human rights factors.

Again these

would be "Reactive Fate Refugees" (Kunz 1981, pg. 44).
Because of the continuation of these factors, it is not yet
possible for refugees to return home.

As illustrated here,

if the original negative factors, continue there is every
indication that repatriation will not occur.

Like

Afghanistan, the continued unacceptable regime has kept
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refugees from returning.
CENTRAL AMERICA
El Salvador has had a history of military control over
its population.

The 1932 peasant uprising was violently

smashed by the ruling plantation owners and the military.
Government opposition and social unrest have been dealt with
harshly ever since.

Murder, torture, political kidnapping

and assassinations have been rampant since the 1970's.

By

1982, there were over 750,000 El Salvadorans out of the
country and 500,000 internally displaced (Billiard, December
1987).

The majority of these refugees went to Honduras
0

where they were confined to refugee camps.

For refugees

from El Salvador it is obvious that they fled their country
over political issues that have spawned human rights abuses.
Once again, these refugees would be considered a "Reactive
Fate Group" (Kunz 1981, pg. 44).
The Salvadorans would probably be considered "The
Majority-Identified and The Events-Alienated" (Kunz 1981,
pg. 42).

This would be due to the large majority of the

population being involved combined with the class conflicts
evident in the situation.

For the Salvadorans, the

predominant forces have been a push out of the country.
Repatriation has been due mainly to the decline of
hostilities and a quieting of the social chaos.

However,

this has been coupled with the negative factor of being
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imprisoned while in the Honduran refugee camps.

In this

unusual circumstance, there is a pull to return home in the
human rights sphere, yet there is also a push from the
country of refuge, the negative push of human rights
infringement by restricting refugees (Billiard, December
1987).

As illustrated by Richard Lawless and Liela Monihan

in their work on Moroccan refugees (1987), human rights
concerns can have a big impact on willingness to return; in
this case it has provided a push out of the host country.
This case has been the opposite of the Afghan situation
in that the Afghan political and human rights situation has
not been resolved, yet the Pakistan government has treated
the Afghans fairly well, giving them refuge, allowing them
to come and go from their camps, and even allowing them to
use Pakistan as a staging base for attacks on Afghanistan.
Guatemala is similar to El Salvador in that its current
political crisis is rooted in a historic pattern of
dominance by the landed elite supported by the military and
U.S. business interests, particularly United Fruit Company.
When Jacobo Arbenz enacted agrarian reform in 1954, it was
not long before he was ousted in a C.I.A. backed coup which
placed Col. Castillo Armas in power.

Since 1954, military

governments have altered history with fraudulent elections,
to insure and provide uninterrupted repressive rule in
Guatemala (Ferris 1987).

As in the case of El Salvador,

these refugees are "The Majority-Identified and The Events-
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Alienated" (Kunz 1981, pg. 42).
Death squads and the systematic elimination of any
moderate opposition created a climate of widespread fear
and terror throughout the country.

With the elimination of

opposition leaders, guerrilla organizations became the only
recognized opposition.

Any indigenous populations who

opposed the government or aided the guerrillas were
destroyed (Ferris 1987).

The refugees fleeing are a

"Reactive Fate Group" (Kunz 1981, pg. 44). The flow out of
Guatemala has been mainly of the Indian population.
Currently there are over 45,000 in Mexico.

After the 1984

raids on the border refugee camps, the Mexican government
moved the refugees to locations away from the borders.
As in the case of El Salvador, the armed military rule
has resulted in oppressive treatment of the population and
extensive human rights abuses.

This is another case where

the crisis is initiated by political conflicts but it is
manifested as a human rights crisis. This created pushes to
drive the Indians out of their country.

With the continued

unrest and attacks on refugee camps, there is a strong
negative force keeping refugees from returning home.
Those refugees that did return were placed in "model"
villages to be "re-educated."

These types of acts serve to

reinforce the fears of those contemplating return (Maldonado
1986).

They would be the recipients of human-rights abuse.

As illustrated by Lawless and Monihan (1987) and Bogue

26

(1969), human rights issues can have a strong effect or be a
push, blocking return.
As in Afghanistan, when the original reasons for
fleeing remain, refugees do not return.
Haiti has gained a sort of infamy for its particularly
harsh violation of human rights.

The Duvalier regime in

Haiti is the western version of Idi Amin in Uganda.

The

government was notorious for violating human rights with the
help of the military. All of these factors taking place over
a long period of time reduced the Haitian economy to a
shambles.

The majority of its flow was into the Dominican

Republic and the United states.
oppressive regime in Haiti.

Many fled due to the

Many more, however, fled

because they were economically destitute.

As both Akol

(1987) and Lamb (1986) have noted, the economic situation in
the home country can be a tremendous force in creating a
refugee flow, or in keeping them from returning.
The initial returnees came back with the fall of the
Duvalier regime.

There were reports that some of the

initial returnees were forced out of their countries of
asylum.

Those that had fled for economic considerations

have adopted a wait and see attitude to determine if there
are economic opportunities available for them once they
return.

Many of the refugees who had fled for political

reasons cite the poor economy as a reason to delay return
(Billiard, March 1987).

Haiti is another example supporting
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Akol's (1987) position on the impact that the economic
situation in the host country can have.

Certainly the

current 1991-1992 crisis in Haiti, while precipitated by a
coup and political persecution, has also been a response to
the economic problems of the country.
This is a good case to compare to the Afghans'
situation, in theft refugees fleeing for one reason in the
interim now have other reasons not to return.
AFGHANISTAN
Afghanistan currently has five to six million refugees
in Pakistan and Iran (U.S. Committee for Refugees 1985).
The Afghans would be considered "The Majority-Identified"
(Kunz 1981, pg. 42).

The Afghan flows were precipitated by

the communist coup of 1978, and the subsequent Soviet
invasion and occupation to support the communist regime in
Kabul (Fullerton 1983).

The Afghans would be considered a

"Reactive Fate Group" (Kunz 1981, pg. 44), because of heavy
protest by the Afghans, a protracted guerrilla war and a
Soviet

"scorched earth"

policy resulting in extensive

damage to the economic infrastructure and agricultural
capabilities.

The initial forces which drove out many

Afghans were political ones, naturally followed by refugees
responding to human rights issues.

Finally, due to time and

continued damage, most of the Afghan refugees have been
turned into economic refugees as well.
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The Afghans fled to Pakistan and Iran where there were
similar cultural backgrounds and where they have been fairly
well received and cared for.

This would be considered a

"Host Related Factor of Cultural Compatibility" (Kunz 1981,
pg. 47).

For the Afghans, the issues at home, combined with

the sympathy and aid in their host countries, provide very
powerful forces to keep the Afghans from returning home.
The Afghans in exile have maintained a strong "homeward
identity view" (Kunz 1981, pg. 48).

Under Kunz's scheme

they would be considered to have an "Ideological National
Orientation in Exile of Restoration Activists" (Kunz 1981,
pg. 45) .
CHARACTERISTICS OF REFUGEE FLOWS
Some assumptions that can be drawn from the previously
listed flows are as follows.

First, if the reasons, or most

of the reasons (pushes), that drove the refugees out of
their homeland continue to exist, they will not return
(Bogue 1969, Lee 1966).
Secondly, if the conditions which hold refugees to the
host country continue (pulls), they will not be likely to
return (Bogue 1969, Lee 1966).
Thirdly, the refugees most likely to return will be
those that have had the conditions driving them out of their
home country removed and are then "pushed" out of their host
country by refoulment (forced return) or some other factor
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which discourage their assimilation into the host society
(Bogue 1969).
Fourthly, the refugees least likely to return will be
those that have the conditions that "pushed" them out of
their home country continue and have conditions that "pull"
them to their host country continue, such as refuge, aid,
and support (Bogue 1969).
The category that the Afghan refugees would fall under
would be the last: the conditions driving them out have not
been resolved, and they have had a good reception in
Pakistan with refuge, aid and support.
Fifth, and perhaps most important, in practice
repatriation is the exception rather than the rule.
The most common types of large refugee flows that have
taken place in this century are made up of "Reactive Fate
Groups" (Kunz 1981, pg. 44).

Secondly, the largest flights

tend to be "The Majority-Identified" (Kunz 1981, pg. 42).
Third, refugees tend to flee to countries that they are the
closest to (Ravenstein 1889).

Finally, refugees flee to

countries that have "Cultural Compatibility" (Kunz 1981).

CHAPTER II
HYPOTHESES
Based on a combination of the works of the previously
presented authors and the common characteristics identified
among world wide refugee flows, it is possible to derive a
number of hypotheses.

The following list of hypotheses is

broken down into three areas: basic independent variables,
intervening variables that have arisen during the Afghans'
refuge, and personal perception variables of the Afghans
interviewed.

These hypotheses will be tested with the data

collected during 1988, and contrasted with recent historical
and political developments.
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Reason For Flight
The obstacles to repatriation will vary in relation to
the original reasons for fleeing.

I.e., the greater the

number of factors causing flight that still exist in the
home country, the less the chance of repatriation.
Age
The relationship between age and probability of
repatriation is curvilinear.
return with their parents.

I.e., the very young will
Those in their late teens,
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having been out of the country their whole lives, will have
less likelihood of repatriating.

Those in their early

twenties and upward to middle age will have a high chance of
repatriating due to their strong attachments.

And the very

old, due to infirmity, will have a lower likelihood of
repatriating.
Family Status
The concerns about safety will vary with the number of
dependents.

I.e., the more dependents, the greater will be

the perceived concerns about personal safety and therefore
greater reluctance to repatriate.
INTERVENING VARIABLES
Time
The greater the time that a refugee has been out of the
home country, the less the likelihood of repatriation.
I.e., the longer a refugee is in a host country, the greater
the chance he or she will have of being assimilated into
various spheres of that society.
Ideological Shift
Besides causing a greater assimilation over time, time
will also be associated with a shift among concerns.
are several directions this shift will go.

There

The general

population will shift to more pragmatic concerns over time,
while the ideological leaders will shift more towards
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ideological concerns.
Geographic
The greater the distance or other geographic obstacles,
the less the likelihood of repatriation • . I.e., those who
traveled the farthest will have the greatest obstacles for
return.
Economic
Host: The greater the degree of economic assimilation
in the host country, the less the likelihood of
repatriation.
Socio-Cultural
Host: The less the socio-cultural similarity with the
host society the greater the likelihood of repatriation.
I.e., the refugees who are Pushtun and staying in a Pushtun
part of Pakistan would have less reason to repatriate than a
Tajik or Hazara staying in a Pushtun area.
PERSONAL PERCEPTION VARIABLES
Economic
Home: The greater the perceived economic opportunities
at home, the greater the likelihood of repatriation. I.e.

,

the refugees who have jobs in Pakistan, but no immediate
chance of work in Afghanistan, should therefore have less of
a desire to repatriate than a refugee farmer who is not
working in Pakistan but can begin farming in Afghanistan as

33

soon as he is able to return home.
Socio-Cultural
Home: The greater the socio-cultural similarity with
the home population, the greater the likelihood of
repatriation.

I.e., those refugees who were minorities in

Afghanistan would be less inclined to repatriate to an area
where they would be an ethnic or religious minorities.
Personal Safety
Home: The less the fear for personal safety from
fighting or mines and comparable hazards to health, the
greater the chance of repatriation.

CHAPTER III
BACKGROUND OF AFGHAN REFUGEE SITUATION
GEOGRAPHY
Geography has always had an impact on refugees; it
helps determine who leaves and from what area, where they go
to, and how difficult it will be for them to return and
reestablish themselves.

Geography is an important factor in

the repatriation of the Afghan refugees.

Afghanistan is a

country of great geographical diversity.

Afghanistan's

extensive mountain ranges, the Hindu Kush and the Pamir Knot
(an extension of the Himalayas), dominate the country
throughout the northeast, the east, the southeast and the
center of the country.

To the west and north are extensive

plains and to the south and southwest are sand and stone
deserts.

Afghanistan is mostly semi-desert ecologically

and is landlocked by its neighbors.

To the north,

Afghanistan is bordered by the former republics of the
Soviet Union, to the west by Iran, to the south and east by
Pakistan, and to the northeast it shares a tiny border with
China.
Afghan refugee movement started in 1978; many Afghans
fled on foot, by donkey or local transport.

As a result

they crossed the borders of Afghanistan into one of their
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two immediate neighbors, Pakistan or Iran.

(See map of the

region, Figure 1.)

HISTORY
The west tends to view the Afghan situation as
beginning in 1979 with the Soviet invasion, when in fact it
is the final step in a historical process which has been
playing itself out for centuries.

The Afghans themselves

view what has happened in a historical context.

For most,

this was one of many invasions and occupations by foreign
powers.

And just as the Greeks, the Persians, the Turks and

the British were finally driven out, so would the Soviets
and the Communists finally be overthrown.

Several elder

Afghan men I spoke to talked about the Third Anglo-Afghan
war in 1919, as though it had happened yesterday.
Afghanistan has been invaded several times in modern
history.

Afghanistan's relationship with the modern world

community begins with the rise of Napoleon at the end of the
eighteenth century.

His successes created heightened

interest in Asia and India.

British distrust of Russia grew

following the Russian attack on Iran and subsequent treaties
which supported the siege of Herat.

Russia then began

diplomatic maneuvering in the Afghan court of Dost Mohamad,
leading to the British invading Afghanistan in 1838 in what
became known as the First Anglo Afghan War (Smith 1973, pg.
4 7) •
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The British took over Qandahar and Kabul and drove Dost
Mohamad to the north and then placed Shah Shuja on the
throne as Amir.

Shah Shuja was dependent on the British

troops to keep him in power.

However, tribal animosities

grew until 1842 when, in an Afghan uprising, the 15,000
British were massacred at Kabul and in retreat to Jalalabad
(Smith 1973, pg. 47).

The next year the British returned

and placed Dost Mohamad on the throne as Amir.

Despite the

return of Dost Mohamad, the British had caused so much
destruction and resentment in Afghanistan that the Afghans
themselves viewed with suspicion and hatred not only the
British but all foreigners.
The Second Anglo-Afghan war, 1878-1879, was
precipitated by a British policy shift to more direct
intervention in the country.

This caused Amir Sher Ali to

turn to the Russians for help.

When Sher Ali welcomed the

Russian envoy but refused to accept a British mission, the
British were so furious they once again invaded Afghanistan
and drove Sher Ali out of power.

(Smith 1973, pg. 49).

Following Sher Ali's death in 1879, Afghanistan was
then ruled by Sher Ali's son, Yaquab Khan.
allowed to rule but only internally.
were handled by the British.

The new Amir was

All outside relations

In response, five years later,

in 1885, the Russians invaded and occupied Panjdeh, north of
Herat.

The British response was to rush to defend Herat.

But instead of a war between these superpowers, a compromise
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was reached and in 1887, what was later to become the
permanent border between Russia and Afghanistan was

established (Smith 1973, pg. 49).
Following Yaquab Khan's abdication in 1879,
1986, pg. 33)

(Nyrop

Abdar Rahman gained the throne and was the

first ruler to transform Afghanistan into the modern state
that it is today.

Rahman was succeeded after his death in

1901 by his oldest son, Habibullah (Nyrop 1986, pg. 38).
During his reign he was able to play Russia off against the
British.

During World War l he offered to attack the

British for the Turks and Germans in exchange for cash and
weapons, while at the same time offering to attack the Turks
and Germans for the British in exchange for an end to
British control.
Afghan monarch.

Habibullah met the classic fate of the
He was assassinated in 1919 under unclear

and unusual circumstances (Nyrop 1986, pg. 41).
Amanullah, Abdar Rahman's third son, seized power upon
Rahman's death despite claims to the throne by his older
brothers and uncle.

Three months later, in May 1919, (Nyrop

1986, pp. 41), Amanullah attacked the British in what became
known as the Third Anglo-Afghan War.

The war only lasted

one month and in the years following several agreements
between the British and Afghans resulted in Afghan autonomy.
Amanullah built relations with the Soviets during his
reign which soured the Afghan-British relations.

Amanullah

also brought about many internal reforms including:
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discouraging the seclusion and veiling of women, abolishing
slavery, secular education for boys and girls, and
Afghanistan's first constitution (Nyrop 1986, pg. 45).

His

reforms led to a revolt by the Shinwari and Tajik tribes,
who forced him from power.
In 1929 following a seven month rule of a Tajik,
Habibullah Khan, the next ruler was King Muhammad Nadir
Shah.

His first act was to remove all the reforms of

Amanullah, his cousin.

Nadir Shah did continue to modernize

Afghanistan with roads, a communication system, a banking
system, and economic planning.

Nadir Shah also was

assassinated, in 1933 (Nyrop 1986, pg. 49).

He was replaced

by his son, Muhammad Zahir Shah.
Muhammad Zahir Shah was the last king to rule
Afghanistan.

During his reign he kept the country neutral

during World War II, wrestled with Pakistan over the control
of the North West Frontier Province, and established
relations with the United states of America.

In 1950,

the

Afghans established an important agreement with the Soviet
Union to get Soviet aid in petroleum exploration and
production and the shipment of goods through Soviet
territory to Afghanistan.

The last had became very

important, as in the past Pakistan had embargoed goods bound
to Afghanistan during their disagreements.

The most

important aspect of the agreement though was to counter
increasing American involvement in Afghanistan, which had
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replaced Britain as the western super-power in the region
(Nyrop 1986, pg. 56).
In 1953, Daoud became Prime Minister of Afghanistan
(Nyrop 1986, pp. 58).

Daoud was unique in that he was the

first western educated member of the royal family to wield
power.

He continued modernization in the social and

economic areas.

In a reenactment of an earlier era, Daoud

attempted to play off the superpowers against each other by
accepting aid from both the Soviets and the Americans.
Daoud had one great obsession during his reign and that
was on the issue of Pushtunistan, the tribal area of the
Pushtuns covering the North East of Afghanistan and the
North West Frontier Province of Pakistan.

This area had

effectively been cut in half by the establishment of the
Durand line in 1893 by British Indian Foreign Secretary, Sir
Mortimer Durand (Dupree 1980, pp. 426-427).

Pushtunistan

has been a continuous sore point between Pakistan and
Afghanistan: would it belong to one country or the other or
remain split or perhaps become an independent nation?

In

1950 Afghanistan supported an independent Pushtunistan
(Nyrop 1986, pg. 55).

As of 1963, Daoud and his Pakistan

counterpart had became so entrenched on the Pushtunistan
issue and the numerous closings of the border and blocking
of trade had become so bad that King Zahir Shah asked for
Daoud's resignation because of the harm to Afghanistan's
economy (Nyrop 1986, pg. 62).
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so for the first time in his reign, King Zahir Shah
ruled as well as reigned.

One of the most important things

to happen during the king's next decade of rule was the
adoption of a new constitution in 1964 (Nyrop 1986, pg. 63).
The new constitution allowed for greater participation in
the government by all groups.
On the first of January in 1965 the People's Democratic
Party of Afghanistan (P.D.P.A.) was founded (Nyrop 1986, pg.
65).

The P.D.P.A. was a Marxist party, although not an

9rthodox one but one formed of diverse leftist groups.
Throughout the rest of the decade student unrest continued
and criticism of the King increased in a number of areas but
mainly over his refusal to approve legislation already
passed by the parliament on such issues as the political
parties bill which allowed opposing political parties (Nyrop
1986, pg. 67).

In 1973, while the King was out of the

country, Daoud, in a bloodless coup, took over the Afghan
government with little resistance (Dupree 1980, pg. 753).
Daoud remained in power until 1978.
In 1977 the two P.D.P.A. groups, the Khalq and the
Fareham, rejoined their forces after a ten year split due to
personality differences of their leaders.

They had both

been continually frustrated in their attempts to be in the
political mainstream despite the aid of the Fareham party
and Babrak Karmal in the 1973 coup when Daoud came to power
(Dupree 1980, pg. 771).
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In April of 1978, following the murder of Mir Akbar
Khyber, who was an important member of the Parcham party,
huge anti-government demonstrations began which resulted in
the arrest of many P.D.P.A. members.

In response, a coup

lead by the P.D.P.A. and party members in the military
overthrew and killed President Daoud (Dupree 1980, pg. 771).
Following the coup, the P.D.P.A., with Taraki as the head,
assumed leadership of the Democratic Republic of
Afghanistan.
The party leaders began a series of reforms which, as
earlier reforms had done, seriously challenged the existing
power structures and traditions of the Afghans.

The reforms

included sweeping land reforms, doing away with mortgages,
and the debts of tenant farmers to landlords, and setting up
state farms.

Unfortunately the land reforms brought little

relief to the farmer peasants; but what it did do was
alienate the village leaders, who traditionally relied on
control of the land for their income and as a means of
authority and control over the peasants.

The other

offensive reforms initiated by the P.D.P.A. were reforms
over the marriage practices of the Afghans.

A minimum

marriage age was set and bride prices were limited.

These

were two issues which were of central importance in rural
society.

In response, armed opposition sprang up throughout

the country.

Conflicts continued to exist between the two

parties in the P.D.P.A., and a purge of Parchamis by the
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Khalqs took place.

The internal situation worsened in

Afghanistan as the opposition to the government and reforms
spread throughout most of the country.

In September, 1979,

Hif izullah Amin, the Prime Minister and a Khalq party
leader, arrested Taraki and threw him in jail where he was
somehow killed (Dupree 1980, pg. 777).

Amin assumed

control of the party and the state, but he continued to be
unable to thwart the increasing opposition of the
mujahideen.

The term Mujahideen is an Arabic word meaning

those who wage a jihad.

Jihad is the struggle by Muslims to

enact the will of God, within oneself and among other people
(Nyrop 1986, pg. 87).

More specific to the Soviet invasion

and subsequent war, the Afghans saw this as a jihad in that
they were fighting non-believers who have invaded their
country and are in opposition to Islam.

The Afghans who

0

have become communists, as in the P.D.P.A. parties, are even
more abhorred by the Mujahideen, for they had abandoned
Islam.
On December 24, 1979, airborne Soviet troops seized
Kabul's airport, followed shortly thereafter by mechanized
ground forces which crossed the border from the north and
seized Kabul (Dupree 1986, pg. 777).

Amin was killed and

the Soviets installed Babrak Karmal as the new president.
The great game which had continued for centuries with
Afghanistan walking the tightrope between the various
superpowers in the region, entered a new chapter.

44

ETHNIC GROUPS
Afghanistan's ethnicity is overwhelming in its
diversity and vastness.

Ethnicity has played an important

role in influencing when refugees fled, where they fled to,
and how they were received, and, depending on the future
political developments, who will return.
The Pushtuns are the largest single distinct ethnic
group in Afghanistan.

They numbered about 6.5 million in

the late 1970's in Afghanistan (Dupree 1980, pg. 59).

One

important aspect of the Pushtuns is the fact that as a
people and as an ethnic group they are split down the middle
between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Another six million

Pushtuns reside in Pakistan (Dupree 1980, pg. 59). The
Pushtuns have traditionally lived in an area to the east and
south and southwest of Kabul in Afghanistan and in the
northwest area of Pakistan.

There have at times been calls

for the formation of a separate country in this area as a
"Pushtunistan."

Because of their ethnic identity and strong

nationalist tendencies, and geographic proximity to the
North West Frontier Province of Pakistan, the refugees who
are Pushtuns have predominantly fled to this area.
The Tajiks number about 3.5 million people (Dupree
1980, pg. 59).

Because the Tajiks are a Persian speaking

people and live primarily in the northeastern provinces of
Afghanistan, many Tajiks who fled sought refuge in Iran
instead of Pakistan.

The Tajiks who have fled into Pakistan
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were from Kabul or the eastern provinces (Farr 1988, pg.
33) .
The Baluch, who number about 100,000, are mainly
pastoral nomads who range across the southwest borderlands
of Afghanistan (Dupree 1980, pg. 59).

The Baluchis have

fled predominantly across the border of southwest Pakistan
into Baluchistan (Farr 1988, pg. 33).
Both the Hazaras and the Aimaqs have remained fairly
isolated in the central mountainous area of Afghanistan
during the war and have had much less external dislocation
as refugees than the other major groups (Farr 1980, pg. 33).
(See map of ethnic distribution, Figure 2.)
AFGHAN SOCIAL ORGANIZATION
The social organization is to a large degree based on
kinship patterns and genealogy.
tribalism of the area.
leadership is feudal.

This reflects the strong

The other type of organization and
Social organization is important to

note, as for some groups their social organization in
Afghanistan has been repeated in exile, while others have
adopted completely new patterns of social organization.
The tribal pattern is important to consider since more
than two-thirds of the population base their social
organization on tribal ties.

This proportion is very high

when compared with the rest of the Middle East.

The Pushtun

refugees from eastern Afghanistan are organized into tribes.
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The kinship system in tribal groups reflects the relative
importance of family relationships above all other factors.
The tribal system in Afghanistan and the patrilineal
foundation on which it is based are the key to social
organization.

Even though kinship may not be directly

linked by blood among all tribal members, each individual
considers himself linked by kinship to the rest of the
tribe.
The nomadic tribes are both political units and
military organizations.

The only reason that their autonomy

exists in most cases is because they have been able to
defend their autonomy.

The tribes are led by a khan.

The

khan is selected by an open acclamation of a tribal jirgah
(a council).

The jirgah is composed of the heads of all the

various lineages.

The khan is usually the eldest son of the

previous khan as well as being in the senior lineage of the
tribe.

The khan governs the tribe in a manner dictated by

tribal custom and practice.

When issues beyond the scope of

the khan arise, the jirgah is called in for consultation.
The status of the tribal members is determined by the
classical patrilineal model of descent and inheritance
through the sons.

The eldest son replaces the father as

head of the household and, in theory at least, the other
sons should pay respect to the eldest son as they would
their father.

Also, as is usually the case in nomadic

tribal systems, status in the group is based on age and
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seniority.
The other major socio-political organization is
feudalism.

This is found in the Hazaras, Tajiks, Uzbeks,

and the Pushtuns in southern Afghanistan.

The feudal system

in Afghanistan is based on a landed aristocracy of khans who
make most of the decisions.
The traditional tribal leadership has survived the
transition to refugee camp life.

However, the ability of

the feudal khans to control their followers has waned
considerably because they have lost their base of authority,
their land.
Several new forms of leadership have emerged as a
result of the current war and refugee situation.

One new

form of leader is the camp leader, or camp "malik."

The

camp maliks derive their power through control over the camp
rations and the ability to negotiate with the local
authorities and relief officials, instead of the traditional
tribal or landlord basis.

The other new forms of leadership

are the resistance party leaders in exile in Pakistan and
Iran, and the local commanders operating inside Afghanistan.
THE VILLAGE
When discussing Afghanistan the village is the next
social unit to consider.

The village is known as the qaryah

in Dari terms and as the keley in Pushto.

The village in

Afghanistan is usually set up in a nuclear pattern of homes
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clustered around the town.

The village is generally

considered to be self-sufficient, with most inhabitants
farming.

There are few specialists in the village.

The

leadership is, in many cases, determined by tribal patterns.
Many of the nomadic peoples spend at least part of the year
in permanent settlements.

Most villages are made up of an

ethnic group or are very closely related by kinship.
The village chief is the malik and is picked by the
villagers themselves.

As in the tribal setting, the village

chief is usually of senior lineage in the village and is
probably the son of the previous malik.

Also, as in the

tribe, status in the village is first determined by which
family one belongs to.

The only other major consideration

for status is landholding.
At the village level, flight was mainly due to
opposition to communism and to the bombing and fighting
{Conner 1984, pg. 177).

These were issues that were

collectively felt by the village.

Initially the villages

were untouched by the 1978 coup and later invasions, but as
the resistance spread out from Kabul they became drawn into
the conflict.

At this level flight was a more collective

decision and action than in the town or urban areas.

THE TOWN
The intermediary between the villages and the urban
areas are the towns.

The town is the lowest commercial
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community in Afghanistan.

People bring their produce from

the villages to the town by donkey or horse, or by packing
it on their backs.
.truck to the cities.

Once at the town it is then shipped by
Towns usually occur where several

major roads or trails come together.

The local civil

servants and police are usually headquartered in the town
and landlords from the surrounding countryside usually live
there.
Flight from the towns was similar to that of the
villages, but in the towns there was greater chance of being
forced to join the communist party or being arrested or
conscripted.

In the towns there were both group decisions

to flee later in the conflict as well as the earlier
decisions which were more individualistic.
URBAN SOCIETY
The urban area of Kabul has long been the seat for the
urban elite which is composed of Pushtun influentials of the
Duranni lineage, and other Pushtuns of the Mohammadzai line.
Beneath the elite are intellectuals who live mainly in Kabul
and are the focus of key positions in government and in
business.
For those from urban society, 74% cited fear of
imprisonment or arrest as a reason for leaving (Conner 1984,
pg. 177).

For those in urban areas the reasons for flight

and decision to do so were primarily individual matters.
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{For the location of the provincial capitals, see Figure 3.)
POWER STRUCTURE

The Pushtuns consider themselves to be the core
community of Afghanistan.

Until recently Pushtun was

generally described as being the Afghan tribe, a name that
was bestowed upon them by early Iranian historians. The
Pushtuns believe that the country belongs to them more than
anyone else.

In 1747, an Afghan, who was one of the leaders

of the army of the Persian shah, Nadir, took a group of
Afghan warriors into Qandahar, following the shah's murder.
The Afghan, Ahmad Khan, was later elected to Khan by a
tribal jirgah.

Ahmad Khan was the first king of

Afghanistan. He was a member of the Sandozai clan. After he
became Khan he took the name of Durr-i-Durran which means,
"the pearls of pearls" {Smith 1973, pp. 45-46).
The name of Durrani was later applied to his tribesmen,
who are still called that to this day. At the time the young
Khan came into power, he consolidated his power by
establishing an agreement with the Moharnrnedzai clan.

These

two lineages continue to remain as the royal elites to this
day.

By comparison, the Uzbeks and the Turkomans, even

though having considerable influence, have power only over
their own tribes or groups.
The strength of the Pushtun tribes has insured their
domination over all other tribes.

They make up over half of
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the population, have supplied the royal family in the past,
hold most of the cabinet positions, and have wielded
considerable economic power.

The Pushtuns' traditional

dominance in weaponry has insured their domination over the
other ethnic groups of the area.
After the consolidation of the Afghan government, it
took many years to bring all the other tribes into line.
Until the end of the nineteenth century, there was an
ongoing intertribal warfare between the Afghan lords and the
Hazaras who refused to be brought under the Khans rule.

The

same thing was taking place with the Tajiks and the Uzbeks.
Besides the Pushtuns, religious leaders have held
considerable power in Afghanistan both officially and
unofficially.

In the past they were informally associated

with rulers and leaders and assisted them in maintaining
control over the people and in interpreting the law.

In

1931 King Nadir Shah founded a body of religious leaders,
'ulama.

This group contained seventeen members, one top

religious leader from each of the seventeen provinces.

The

duties of the 'ulama, was to advise the government on
religious issues, control the courts and schools, and pass
judgment on the practiced public and private norms and
values.

Their political power began to wane with the

election of Daoud as prime minister in 1953 (Dupree 1980,
pg. 108).
The tribal jirgah when done at a national level is
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referred to as a Loya Jirgah, and is used to garner support
and gain a consensus.

Besides tribal leaders and other

local elites, religious leaders also sit on the Loya Jirgah
(Nyrop 1986, pg. 269).

With the takeover of the government

in 1978, by the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan, a
number of programs and reforms were initiated that were seen
as anti-Islamic.

Even though later attempts were made by

the POPA to incorporate aspects of Islam and Islamic
leadership, to gain popular support, the few official
mullahs, and other religious leaders who expressed support
for the new regime, were horribly murdered if caught by the
resistance (Nyrop 1986, pp. 270-271).
RELIGION
Almost all the Afghans are Moslems.

Islam has both

general beliefs that can be applied to refugees as well as
specific beliefs about how to view and treat them.

For the

Afghan refugees, being Moslems and fleeing to Moslem
countries has had a tremendous impact on how they perceive
themselves, how others perceive them, and how they are
treated.
For the Afghans, their views on Islam have been
influenced by their customs held even before the advent of
Islam.

Pushtunwali is one such example.

Pushtunwali is a

complex code of honor which dictates behavior on and off the
battlefield as well as in daily life and even issues of
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revenge.
One very important tenet of Islam is the requirement to
offer sanctuary to the persecuted. This has played an
important role in the treatment of the Afghan refugees by
the Pakistanis.

The Afghans were constantly offering meals

and inviting me to stay with the various families in
Pakistan.

When asked why people were so kind, one young man

replied, "God likes us to help people. I'm doing this to
make God happy."
There is also a specific historical situation in Islam
which defines the Afghan refugee situation in religious
terms, sanctifies it and obligates the Pakistanis to offer
sanctuary to their Moslem brothers (Farr 1988, pg. 41).

In

622 A.O., Muhammad, the prophet of Islam, had to flee Mecca
to Medina, because his preaching in Mecca had embittered the
town leaders.
1986, pg. 88).

The flight became known as the "Hejra" (Nyrop
The Afghan refugees are called the

Muhajarin, or the people of the Hejra (Farr 1988, pg. 41).

CHAPTER IV
THE AFGHAN REFUGEE SITUATION
With the communist coup and subsequent war in the late
1970's and 1980's, nearly two-thirds of the estimated 1979
population of 15.5 million have been uprooted (Nyrop 1986,
pg. 85).

Estimates place the number of internal refugees,

those still inside Afghanistan, close to two or three
million (Farr 1988, pg. 5).

The majority of the displaced

Afghans, however, are external refugees, those people who
have left Afghanistan.

According to Iranian Government

figures, there are 1.9 million Afghans refugees currently
living in Iran (Nyrop 1986, pg. 85).

The majority though

have fled to Pakistan.
There are 3.2 million refugees in Pakistan registered
with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(U.N.H.C.R.).

There are perhaps as many as a quarter

million that are not registered with the U.N.H.C.R.,
bringing the total population in Pakistan up to 3.5 million
(Farr 1988, pg. 5).
AFGHAN REFUGEE FLOWS
These refugees did not leave Afghanistan all at once.
There

were

refugee

flows

at

variable

rates

which

were
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dependent upon internal events in Afghanistan.

Based on the

work of Kerry Conner (1984), one can identify a number of peak
refugee

flows

Afghanistan.

(traditionally

termed

vintages)

out

of

Initially there was a very high flow to Pakistan

in 1978 following the coup.

Following the murder of Tariki,

and later Amin and the arrival of the Soviet troops, in late
1979

and

into

early

1980,

another

large

flow

departed.

Between the end of 1980 and early 1981, Conner attributes the
high

flow

problems,

to

several

possibilities:

internal

economic

military conscription by the Soviet regime,

better organization among the resistance commanders.

and
The

final large peak of refugee outflow in late 1981 and through
1982,

Conner

attributes

to

new conscription programs

expanded military offensive (Conner 1984, pp. 173-176).

and
The

rate of flow was lower in 1983 and stayed constant through
1984, although it was nowhere near the rate of the first flow
(Conner 1984, pp. 173-176).

After 1985 the flow considerably

lessened although it never dried up.

Following the battle of

Jalalabad in the summer of 1989 there were an additional
70,000 refugees who came out through the Khyber Pass into the
Northwest Frontier province of Pakistan.

Many of the refugees

have been outside their homeland well over a decade now.
AFGHAN REFUGEE ASSIMILATION
When a refugee population has been out of its country
for as long as many of the Afghans have, time becomes a very
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important factor in terms of being assimilated into the
local economy.

The longer refugees remain in a host

country, the more they tend to be assimilated into the local
economy.

This has certainly been the case in Pakistan, even

though the majority of the refugees live in camps set apart
from the Pakistanis.
The Afghans have established an economic infrastructure
both among the refugee population as well as the local
population.

To give a few examples, many of the refugees

operate street vending businesses which are set up to sell
food, medicine and other household supplies; others have
leased store fronts to sell Afghan crafts.

Afghan men work

as tonga (horse cart) drivers, and others who were trained
M.D.s and lawyers have practices among the local population.
Practically every occupation from laborers and tailors to
mechanics and teachers are evident.

In other words, the

refugees are doing much the same type of work as the local
Pakistanis are doing.

However, they aren't necessarily

displacing the locals (even though that was the local
perception by the Pakistanis), for much of the Afghans' work
is providing goods and services to the Afghan refugees
themselves.
The refugee camps look permanent.
still living in tents.

Very few people were

There were still a number of tents

evident at many of the camps, but from what can be seen and
what we were told, most people use the tents now for storage
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or visitors.

In the last decade most refugees have built

permanent housing out of mud bricks.

These houses are

virtually identical to what the poorer Pakistanis live in.
The Afghans have been in Pakistan so long in fact that many
of them have built a number of rooms onto their homes.

They

have built mud walls surrounding their homes, dug wells, put
in gardens, built awnings and, in some cases, put television
antennae on their roofs and strung electrical lines to their
mud homes.
Cultural assimilation is different from economic
assimilation or establishing permanent residences.
Culturally, the Afghans and Pakistanis are very similar in a
number of areas.

Many of the residents of the Northwest

Frontier Province and the Northeast section of Afghanistan
are the same ethnic group, Pushtun, and speak the same
language, Pushto.

The ethnic identity of the Pushtun, on

both sides of the border, is so strong that there have been
a number of secessionist movements in the past and in the
present to secede from both countries and establish a
"Pushtunistan" between Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Many of the Afghans are not first time arrivals in
Pakistan.

Many have been migrating back and forth across

the border for years before the conflict as nomads, traders
and herders.

Some even had relatives or acquaintances in

Pakistan from before the war.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, both Afghans and
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Pakistanis are Muslims.

Being Muslim has many important

ramifications for this particular situation. Since the
Afghans are Muslims and fighting "non-believers," this
struggle has taken on the mantle of being a Jihad or holy
war.

Subsequently this means that the Pakistanis are

religiously duty bound to provide food and shelter to those
fighting in the Jihad or fleeing from it.

There is also the

standard duty of the Moslem to provide for the stranger and
traveller and also the needy. In other words, the Pakistanis
are doubly induced to help the Afghans.
One aspect that is in dispute in this situation is the
matter of economic considerations and how they affect the
refugee's decision to repatriate.

Economic considerations

have been the key factor and at times the only factor in
other refugee repatriations.

Economic concerns have caused

many refugee flows initially and have had great impact in
blocking returnees or encouraging them to stay in a host
country.

There are three major ways that economics affect a

refugee population.
The first is the economic situation in the refugee's
own country.
people out.

A bad economy in a home country will "push"
Secondly, a host country with a good economy

will actually "pull" refugees to it (Bogue 1969, pp. 753754).

Third, acting as a further "pull" is the

international community, responding favorably to the
refugees and providing quite a bit of aid to them.
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Afghanistan continues to have a growing economic crisis
which pushes the refugees away, pulls them into host
countries, and keeps them from returning home.
The Afghans insist that they don't care about economics
or money, just about being in their country.

Officially the

government welcomes and aids the refugees, although it is
also common to be told by officials that they will be glad
when the refugees go home.

The impacts the refugees are

having on Pakistan include Afghans competing with Pakistanis
in the local economy, crowding in the cities and surrounding
areas, and competing over resources such as water, land and
fire wood.

Also there are increasing tensions among the

various ethnic groups and between Pakistanis and Afghans.
The Pakistanis, in growing numbers, insist that the Afghans
are only in Pakistan to sell drugs and weapons.

Crime that

takes place in Peshawar is usually automatically blamed on
the Afghans by the Pakistanis, whether it's burglaries or
political murders.

The Pakistanis are also resentful of all

the aid received by the Afghans.

In some cases the Afghans

were better off than the local people, and yet it was the
Afghans who received aid.

These negative views go both

ways; it is common to hear Afghans speak in disparaging
terms of the Pakistanis.

One scene witnessed in public in

Peshawar was an Afghan man admonishing a Pakistani woman for
having a misbehaving child, and the Afghan turning and
announcing, "These Pakistanis don't know how to raise their
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children."

Despite the close ethnic and religious

backgrounds of these two groups, there has always existed a
certain underlying tension.

The Pakistanis view the Afghans

as arrogant, illiterate, mountain nomads.

The Afghans view

the Pakistanis as stupid, docile farmers who live in the
valleys.

Many of the international agencies and workers

espouse a view somewhere between these.
Finally, and not least, are human rights and human
safety concerns.

Many observers assumed that the refugees

would be automatically returned once the Soviets withdrew.
However, the war continues, first without the Russians, now
without the communists.
Even though there are unique characteristics to the
Afghan refugee situation, not the least the sheer numbers of
people involved, there are clear indicators from other
refugee flows and subsequent repatriations, of how certain
factors affect the refugees' flight, assimilation, and
possible repatriation.
AFGHANS IN THE PROCESS MODEL
The Afghan refugee crisis is rather unique in that all
four spheres or types of factors mentioned--political, human
rights, economic and socio-cultural--came into play in
driving the refugees out of their home country.

First in

the political sphere we have the coup of 1978, and the
subsequent placement of a communist government in Kabul.
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This is followed shortly by the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan.

In the next stage, opposition to the

government and Soviet forces means more battles and more
governmental retaliation.

The army is forcibly conscripting

youth to serve against the Mujahideen.

Refugees flee to

avoid personal injury to themselves or their children.
flee to avoid Soviet retaliation.

Many

The young men flee forced

conscription, to avoid fighting their own countrymen.
As the new government continued in power, other changes
took place on the social and cultural level. The government
instituted land reforms, passed laws against the customary
bride fees, and even began schooling of girls.

All of these

changes were culturally quite abhorrent to traditional
Moslems.
Finally, with the extensive war, combined with the
Soviet's

"scorched earth" policy, all agriculture came

grinding to a halt.

Many of the irrigation ditches and

tunnels were blown up or filled with silt.

Roads were

destroyed, and many economic areas, such as markets, were
deserted.
When the Afghans fled, they went to a country that ·was
politically supportive of the cause of the Afghans in
opposing the Soviets and communist government in Kabul.

The

Pakistanis also directly supported the Afghans in their
struggle by providing weapons and training, and allowing the
transit of weapons from other countries.
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In the human rights sphere,

the Pakistanis provided

aid, food, protection, and shelter and opposed attempts by
the Afghan army to come into Pakistan after the rebels.

At

the same time, Pakistan also exhibited strong positive
"pulls" in the socio-cultural sphere. For example, many of
the Pakistanis and Afghans have similar ethnic backgrounds.
In the N.W.F.P., all are Pushtun.
common or similar languages.

In many cases they speak

Many of the refugees have been

coming and going across the border for years as traders and
nomads.
And the most important factor of all, they are all
Moslems.

The Islamic creed demands that sanctuary be given

to those in need.

Additionally they are both fighting what

they perceive as a common enemy to the Islamic way of life,
communism.
And finally, the Pakistanis have provided for the
Afghans economically, both directly with aid, food, shelter,
and medicine, as well as indirectly by allowing some
penetration into the Pakistan economy.

There have been some

workshops set up for rug weaving and ethnic art work, as
well the Afghan trucking industry which has sprung up to
supply transport for poor Pakistanis. All these factors
still exist, holding the Afghans in Pakistan.
So what needs to be considered is this: would
reasonable persons (refugees) decide to leave a country of
long standing refuge, where the government sides with them
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politically, sees that they are protected and safe, supports
them and allows them to make a living, where the local
people are similar in manner and custom and religion, and
return to a country in a civil war, to face personal danger,
ethnic strife, and economic destitution? Is this a
reasonable exchange?

Or will forced repatriation be

necessary?
In the Afghan refugees' situation, all the positive
factors drawing the Afghans to Pakistan are intact.

All the

negative factors pushing the Afghans out of their country
are constantly changing.
is unknown.

However, the final outcome still

With the Soviet troop withdrawal and removal of

the Kabul government, civil war may still embroil the
country as various groups vie for power in the new
government.

If a civil war takes place among the various

factions, the civilian population will be enmeshed in it due
to the very nature of the Afghans' guerrilla tactics.

The

Afghans have always been heavily dependent on local
population support.

Any civil war in Afghanistan will

certainly involve a substantial portion of the population.
Not only will the civilians be in the middle of a civil war;
they will probably be targeted as logistical support by the
opposing factions.
The groups that are currently vying for power have a
number of platforms, some calling for Islamic fundamentalist
reform, others a return of the former king, and of course
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the Russians hope for a pro-Moscow government in

Kabul.

There is no doubt that, whatever faction or coalition of
factions gains power, some group will be opposed to it for
political, religious, or ethnic reasons.

There is every

reason to believe that the civil war will break out along
ethnic or religious lines.
Finally we must consider that the country is devastated
economically.

Huge amounts in aid and extensive local

efforts will be required to rebuild the country.

If the

government is under siege or there is no government
infrastructure, there will not be a functioning economy as
well.

If large parts of the

population are fleeing a civil

war there will certainly be no rebuilding taking place.
With a fleeing population there will be no redevelopment of
agriculture,

even direct aid distribution to the returnees

will be difficult.

What can be done then?

Should all aid

and support be cut off from the Afghans in Pakistan, forcing
them home?

While appearing as a solution it can only be a

temporary one at best.

As we know from other forced

repatriations, they are painful at best, deadly at the
worst.
The most important factor to deal with in Afghanistan
is its political crisis, followed by the economic crisis.
Afghanistan needs a stable government and an economic base
to build from, before one can reasonably expect the refugees
to return home.

CHAPTER V
METHODS
Data for this thesis were collected through one hundred
interviews conducted in Pakistan during the Fall of 1988.
The interviews provided data regarding the background of the
refugees, their previous condition in Afghanistan and their
life in Pakistan.

Besides the direct responses to the

questions (such as yes or no, or other answers that have
been categorized in the following data sections) all answers
and comments made during the interviews were taken down word
for word as they were given in English by the respondent or
as they were translated by my guides.

Some of the open

ended responses were quite lengthy and very rich in detail.
As an illustration, when asked why they left, a common
answer was, "Because of the Russians", the respondents would
then go on and give several pages of in-depth explanation
about why they left because of the Russians.

While those

data do not lend themselves well to statistical analysis,
they give a great deal of insight into the motivations,
feelings and perceptions of the Afghan respondents.

These

open-ended responses will be used when applicable to try to
understand the refugees' perspective in a fuller social
context, and where possible identify the difference between
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the "expected" answer and how the respondents really felt.
Besides the interview data, field notes were made following
each batch·of interviews and of any situation or observation
relating to the Afghan refugee situation.

Also, notes were

kept of interviews and conversations with refugee aid
workers, Pakistani officials, U.N.H.C.R. workers, and
anthropologists and journalists who were in Peshawar and
Quetta at the time.

This information will be used, when

applicable, to try to more fully understand the Afghan
refugee situation and the responses of the refugee
respondents.

Data were collected in both Baluchistan and

the North West Frontier Province so as to get a more
representative sample of Afghans, although the Afghan
refugees in Pakistan are primarily from the border
provinces.
The population that was studied was a small segment of
the 3.5 million Afghans currently in refuge in Pakistan.
Due to the great mobility of the Afghan refugee population
in Pakistan and the fact that so many refugees are not
registered with the various refugee agencies, or are double
registered in different camps, or are registered in camps
and then have gone back across the border to continue
fighting in the Jihad (as well as my own monetary, time and
political restraints), it was not feasible or possible to
choose a random sample.

Instead, I used Afghans as guides

and requested them to take me to many different refugee
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camps in the areas around Peshawar and Quetta, in order to
get as wide a range of subjects as possible.

sixteen different camps were visited.

Overall,

The respondents were

selected on the basis of availability; some knew the guides,
most did not.

If the guide knew someone in the camp, we

would go to his hut and ask him to send sons or friends off
to collect those willing to be interviewed.

People were

also stopped in the streets and asked to be interviewed.

We

did this if the guide did not know anyone in the camp.
Never in my presence did anyone refuse to be interviewed;
most were very willing.
To work with as wide a range of subjects as possible,
if one person from a specific family was interviewed, we
would not interview others from that same family.

Also, if

we interviewed several people from one village in
Afghanistan, we then moved on, trying to talk with people
from many different areas.

If we interviewed several older

men, we would ask for some young men and vice versa. The
same procedures were followed for the educated or uneducated
and professions, such as farmer versus teacher or resistance
leader versus follower.

Once the respondent was selected,

the guide and I would explain the nature of the research
project and who I was.

The respondents were not paid for

their time.
Of the three different Afghan guides with whom I
worked, the first I met in Portland, the second was arranged
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by the Belgium

s.o.s.

Center (a refugee aid group) in

Peshawar, and the third guide was arranged through the Save
the Children Federation (a refugee aid group) in Quetta.
The guides were paid for their time and chosen on the basis
of their fluency in English (all were very fluent) and their
knowledge of the surrounding camps.

I spent several hours

with each of the guides before the interviews explaining the
project and the nature of each question.

I stressed the

importance of asking the questions of each respondent in the
same way, without leading any of the subjects.

The few

times I was not able to work with the guides, I went to
various sections of Peshawar and Quetta that had Afghan
shops and merchants and requested to interview them.

I

deliberately turned down an off er from the Peshawar minister
of refugees for his office to provide me with a guide, as
well as turning down offers from two resistance leaders, one
in Peshawar and one in Quetta, to provide me with guides.

I

did this because I had been warned that they would only take
me to those whom they wanted me to interview.
Approximately half the refugees spoke little or no
English, and the guides acted as translators.
did speak English I interviewed directly.

Those that

Of the refugees

that spoke no English, I was able to verify the yes and no
responses to questions, where they were from and how many
children they had and other short answers, as I had studied
Pushtun and spoke it a little.

During the interviews, the
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questions were asked off a typed interview sheet, and all
refugees were asked the same questions in the same order and
same manner, except for the first ten respondents which I
used as a sample survey.

These first ten respondents

suggested an additional twelve questions, which were asked
of all the following subjects.
During the interviews, responses were recorded in
writing in English, by myself, as they were given, either
directly or through the translation of my guides.
Despite the problems of conducting this survey in
difficult conditions, such as language barriers, it is
believed that the research represents reliable data given
the situation.
PROBLEMS IN THE METHODOLOGY
Qualifiers
1.

I attempted to conduct the interviews anonymously,

but most of the Afghans kept insisting on telling me their
names.

So I took all of their names in order to remain

consistent.

However, I have been careful not to use any of

the names in the reporting of the data, nor have I ever
listed the names with any of the data being analyzed.
2.
Afghans.

The question of age is an interesting one for the
You are either a young man, a middle aged man, or

an old man.

Some people honestly admitted that they did not

know their exact chronological age.

I was told later by
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Sar-Baz that, in general, Afghans do not keep track of their
birthdays.

Based on the conversations with the respondents

about two-thirds knew when they were born.

If people were

not sure I asked them to make the best guess they could.
3.

Enquiring about ethnic group or tribe resulted in

mainly a Pushtun response, but there were also some Tajiks
and an occasional Dari speaker. Some responses though were
simply, "I'm Afghan" (which generally means Pushtun).
4.

The marital status question was interesting in that

people would give me shocked looks if they had children
themselves, and answer, "Why of course I'm married". In
general, if the men were old enough to be married they were.
5.

Questions about the number of children in each

family and their ages evoked differing responses.
are the Afghans' great pride and joy.

Children

They love to show

them off, especially their sons, as in the case of the
little boy who was presented to me to sing the song about
"death to the Russians."

Other men were interviewed while

holding little squirming two or three year old daughters in
their arms, yet they wouldn't admit to having girl children.
They would say "Yes I have two children, .. oh, and one
daughter."

Also, many of them weren't sure about the ages

of their children and would reply "Oh, .. he is two or maybe
three."

I made it a point to ask people how many sons and

daughters they had.

As far as children's ages, I asked

parents to give me a specific age or their best guess.
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6.

Answers to the questions about home town revealed

that many people lived in rural communities and would give
the name of the nearest big town and the province they lived
in.

In the analysis of the data, province was used to

determine geographic location (except for those who said
they were from Kabul) .
7.

The years of education question revealed that many

people were literate who had never been to school.

Many

were self taught, or had gone to the mosques where they had
been helped by imans or other learned men who would go to
the mosque to help those who wanted to learn.

I was told

that this was'customary in Afghanistan as a way for people
to learn.

The three levels of education seen among the

respondents were: formally educated at a school; informally
educated, at a mosque; and illiterates with no education.
8.

When asked the reasons for leaving Afghanistan,

some responded "because of the communists," others "because
of the Soviets;" some gave the reason as the war, others say
all of these.

The answers given were difficult to analyze

since some were so short yet were meant as a global
response, others were so lengthy and had so much detail that
they fit into all of the categories.
9.

The respondents were asked, "When did you leave?"

Most answers were straight forward, although a couple of
people stated they had never left their country, that they
were just "visiting" in Pakistan before returning home.
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Others said they left then went back several times.

When

people said they left and reestablished their home and
family in Pakistan was the answer I used for when they fled.
10.

People were asked where they lived in Pakistan.

Some lived in camps, others lived in camps that were really
spontaneous settlements. Others, especially the well off, do
not stay in the camps, but are merely registered in the
camps and in fact live in town or in the nearest city.
11.

People were asked, "Do you work here in Pakistan?"

Many had regular jobs such as drivers or merchants. Others
had apprentice positions such as tailors or masons through
the local VOLAGS, such as the Belgium center. Others said no
they had no job except living or that their job was the
jihad and helping the Mujahideen.
12.

Respondents were asked, "What was your job in

Afghanistan?"

This seemed rather straightforward, once they

understood that it was their occupation before the war that
I was interested in.

What surprised me is the huge number

of young men who had been students in their early teens or
younger, and only Mujahideen since. It raised the same
concerns for myself that others have noted: that this is a
whole generation of young men who know nothing except
fighting in a war.
13.

The respondents were asked, "Is your family here?"

This was fairly straightforward.

For the majority of men,

it was a foregone conclusion. Because if they had come out
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of Afghanistan due to heavy fighting, it was almost a sure
bet that they had brought out their families long before.
Of course some of their families had been killed and a few
still had relatives inside. Then there is the question of
what is family. For the Afghans, it is considered in its
extended form.

For some, family includes cousins, aunts,

uncles, siblings, and in-laws, besides the regular
accompaniment of what we would consider families of fathers,
mothers and direct children.
14.

"Will you return before the Soviet's withdrawal?"

This and subsequent questions which I see as being
"repatriation" questions seemed to be the most difficult in
that the Afghans see these in a very mono-ideological way.
What I mean by this is that when I would ask this and other
repatriation questions, I would get a comprehensive response
which usually included most of the following ideological
components: "I'll return when the communist repression ends,
the puppet government falls, there is Islamic rule, and we
can live in peace."

It was difficult to separate out the

various issues. I would ask, "Well, what about just the
withdrawal of Soviet forces?", and I would receive the whole
response once again.

Basically, though, most responded

that, "Yes, the withdrawal of Soviet forces was the most
important issue of all."

If the respondents would not give

me a direct answer I would repeat the specific question
until I would get an answer specific to it.
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15.

The respondents were asked, "Will you return to

Afghanistan if the Mujahideen and the other parties are
fighting for power?"

Besides the problem noted above, this

question was interesting in that many people refused to
admit that this could happen.

On the one hand, I think a

lot of people had been told by their leaders that this would
not happen; and, on the other hand, I think they might have
been a little miffed about the way the western press treated
the issue -

which was that as soon as the Soviets left, a

huge civil war would break out among all the groups trying
to gain control of the country.

However, these people had

all been fighting together and cooperating. I think many
actually believed that after being in the jihad together
that they had a bond that superseded any previous rivalries
or jealousies.
16. one of the biggest limitations in this research
project revolves around the relation between what
respondents say they will do, and what they are actually
likely to do in the future.

One of the intentions of this

project was to be able to predict refugee flows and possible
repatriation based on the responses given by the Afghan
subjects who were interviewed.

Because the data were

collected at a time now over three years before any large
scale repatriation was even possible, time has become an
intervening variable impacting beliefs and possible future
actions.

As Herbert Blumer noted in his work in 1948,
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"Public opinion must obviously be recognized as having its
setting in a society and as being a function of that society
in operation.

The formation of public opinion occurs

through the interaction of groups" (Blumer 1948, pp. 543544).

The point Blumer was making was that opinion is not

just the sum of individual beliefs.

As he notes, "Public

opinion does not occur through an interaction of disparate
individuals who share equally in the process." (Ibid, pg.
544)

More specific to the Afghan situation and this

research is the relation between intention and behavior.

As

Fishbein and Azjen noted in their work, Belief, Attitude,
Intention and Behavior: An Introduction to Theory and
Research {1975), the best way to predict a people's behavior
is to ask them if they are going to perform that behavior.
Fishbein and Azjen believed that there was a high
correlation between intention to perform a particular
behavior and a person's actually performing that behavior.
However, they go on to qualify this by noting, "The longer
the time interval between measurement of intention and
observation of behavior, the greater the probability that
the individual may obtain new information or that certain
events will occur which will change his intention ... The
greater the number of intervening steps, the lower the
intention behavior correlation will be" (Fishbein and Ajzen
1975, pp. 369-370).

All three of these authors' work has

important implications for this research.

The Afghans are
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ideologically oriented, and very much collectively so.
While they had pragmatic objections to the Soviets and
communists they were also wrapped in an
ideological/emotional blanket.

Their stated intentions

bordered on attitudes and opinions, in sense that their
responses were probably closer to Blumer's opinions than to
Fishbein and Ajzen's intentions.

Despite my efforts, it was

very difficult to interview people in private.
relatives and neighbors wanted to be present.

Often their
Even when I

would have the observers leave, they would hang around
outside and peer in the doors or windows, putting latent
pressure on the respondent to give the correct collective
answer.

Approximately half the interviews were done with

others present.

As noted previously the Afghans are to a

large degree tribal and they rely on tribal leadership.
According to current contacts I have in Pakistan, even with
recent developments, the leaders are discouraging wide scale
return currently.
As far as behavioral intentions at the time of the
interviews (1988), the respondents did not appear to really
know what would be happening in the future.

When they were

asked to give specific times of when an event might occur
(such as repatriation), they would say "Only Allah knows."
It was assumed that the Kabul government would collapse with
the withdrawal of the Soviets in the Spring of 1989.

Many

refugees felt there would not be fighting among the parties
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once the communists were removed.

When the refugees were

asked when they would return only six percent gave an actual
time, the rest said either, "When Allah wishes," or they
gave a list of preconditions.

What this illustrates is

that, despite what they said, the relation between their
intentions and possible repatriation behavior is a very
complex one.

This relation is certainly heavily impacted by

the time interval and intervening steps, as noted by
Fishbein and Ajzen, as well as the issue Blumer raised of
the relationship between individual opinion and collective
belief.
17.

Another important consideration is that the number

of cases as well as the type of sample do not allow for a
multivariate statistical analysis.

In the following data

presentation and analysis, I do not attempt to control for
intervening variables or do multivariate analysis.

I will

examine the relations between pairs of variables in the form
of cross tabulations.

I must also acknowledge that not

enough questions were asked about the actual decision-making
process by which the refugees left Afghanistan or the
process by which they will decide to repatriate.

Even

though the respondents were asked as individuals, they
certainly will rely to a great extent on their leadership in
the decision making process.

One must also recognize that

the decision to return and when to return will not be left
solely to the Afghans but will be impacted, if not
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manipulated, by foreign governments, relief agencies, and
Pakistan.
These qualifiers do not mean that the view and
intentions of the refugees based on their answers in 1988
will be unimportant.

However, I do not intend to present

these findings as the sole predictor of repatriation
behavior that may take place in the future.

Instead, I

present these data as part of what will be a very complex
process and in all probability will take years to resolve.
Based on past refugee flows and repatriation, the Afghan
situation will probably never be completely resolved.

I

believe that the orientations and answers given by the
refugees I interviewed will be part of this complex process,
and I present the data and conclusions in that context.

CHAPTER VI
FINDINGS
The questions and findings are broken down into three
major areas.

The first is basic demographics.

The second

is intervening variables, such as how much aid have you
received from Pakistan (these are headed with IN). Third are
issues directly affecting repatriation (these are headed
with RP).

Since there were 100 subjects, in all of the

basic findings presented below the percent is the same as
actual number of respondents.

For example, 50 percent is

equal to an N of 50.
Of the 100 subjects interviewed, the ages ranged from
15 to 70 years, with a mean of 35.85 and a mode of 30.
Of the respondents, 50 percent were 31 years old or
less.

This is a characteristic grouping of agriculturalists

living in a non-industrialized society.

(See Table I.)

The respondents were primarily Pushtun speakers,
totaling 83 percent.

Tajik speakers made up 13 percent of

the group, and four percent were other.

(See Table II.)

Of the refugees interviewed, 76 percent were married,
20 percent were single, and four percent widowed.
III.)

(See Table

Virtually all people of marrying age were either

married or widowed.

My refugee assistant claimed that
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TABLE I
AGE
Category
15-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65-70

yrs.
yrs.
yrs.
yrs.
yrs.
yrs.

Frequency

Percent

21
32
20
14
8
5

21. 0
32.0
20.0
14.0
8.0
5.0

100

100.0

CUmulative
Percent
21.0
53.0
73.0
87.0
95.0
100.0

-Total

TABLE II
ETHNIC GROUP
Category

Frequency

Percent

Pushtun
Dari
Tajik
Uzbek
Baluch
Turkoman

83
1
13
1
1
1

83.0
1. 0
13.0
1. 0
1. 0
1. 0

Total

100

100.0

CUmulative
Percent
83.0
84.0
97.0
98.0
99.0
100.0

TABLE III
MARITAL STATUS
Category

Frequency

Percent

Single
Married
Widowed

20
76
4

20.0
76.0
4.0

Total

100

100.0

CUmulative
Percent
20.0
96.0
100.0
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Afghans never divorced because no one would want to marry
someone who has been divorced.

Nor would they let their

sister or daughter marry a man who has divorced.
The respondents with children were 74 percent of the
group and they were all married.

In fact most of the

refugees were surprised to be asked if they had children.
The typical response was, "Why of course I have children;
I'm married."
At the same time unmarried subjects expressed surprise
at being asked if they had children.
percent had no children.

Of the respondents, 26

Of those with children, 55 percent

of the total sample had three or more children and 19
percent had seven or more.

(See Table IV.)

In questioning further about their children, 50 percent
of the sample had children who were five years old or less
and 67 percent had children who were 14 years or less.
Table V.)

(See

While the large numbers of children are a

characteristic of non-industrialized societies, I was also
informed by a number of Afghans that Allah and Islam wanted
them to have lots of children.

I was even admonished for

being married and not having children yet.

I was scolded,

"If you Americans weren't so greedy for your cars and
television sets, you could then afford to have lots of
children."
The respondents were primarily men, 96 percent.

Only

four women were interviewed due to the cultural restrictions
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TABLE IV
NUMBER OF CHILDREN
Number
None
One
Two
Three
Four
Five
Six
Seven +
Total

Frequency

Percent

CUmulative
Percent

26
9
10
6
11
10
9
19

26.0
9.0
10.0
6.0
11. 0
10.0
9.0
19.0

26.0
35.0
45.0
51.0
62.0
72.0
81.0
100.0

100

100.0

TABLE V
AGE OF YOUNGEST CHILD
Age
Category
None
Under Five
6-10
11-14
15-18
19-22
23 +

Total

Frequency

Percent

CUmulative
Percent

26
50
11
6
2
4
1

26.0
50.0
11. 0
6.0
2.0
4.0
1. 0

26.0
76.0
87.0
93.0
95.0
99.0
100.0

100

100.0
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on the interactions between men and women.

I felt that even

though the number of women interviewed were limited that
they might off er some possible insights on potential
differences.

The women that were interviewed showed no

consistent differences in their responses from those of the
men.
Eight percent of the interviewees claimed to be party
leaders or tribal leaders and six percent were visibly
wounded or crippled due to involvement in the war.
When asked where their homes were, 11 different
provinces were listed by the respondents.

The largest group

by far, 45 percent, were from the Ningrahar province.
next largest group, 22 percent, were from Kabul.

The

(See map on

Origin of Refugee Respondents, and see Table VI.)
When asked about their educational background, there
was a wide disparity in levels of education.

Thirty eight

percent of the subjects had no formal education (See Table
VII.)
For the Afghans, there are two types of educations that
are utilized.

The first is the standard education of

schools, textbooks and hired teachers teaching a standard
educational curriculum.

The second type of education is

going to the local mosque and being taught to read the Koran
by the local Mullah.

I was informed that if someone wanted

to learn to read and write he or she would go to the mosque
and ask for help, and either the Mullah or some other
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TABLE VI
PROVINCE FROM
Province

Frequency

Percent

CUmulative
Percent

Jowzjan
Kabul
Ningrahar
Qandahar
Helmand
Uruzgan
Kunduz
Laghman
Logar
Paktia
Kapisa

1
22
45
8
2
1
3
6
9
2
1

1. 0
45.0
8.0
2.0
1. 0
3.0
6.0
9.0
2.0
1. 0

1.0
23.0
68.0
76.0
78.0
79.0
82.0
88.0
97.0
99.0
100.0

Total

100

100.0

--

22~0

TABLE VII
YEARS OF EDUCATION
Years

Frequency

Percent

CUmulative
Percent

None

38
3
8
32
19

38.0
3.0
8.0
32.0
19.0

38.0
41.0
49.0
81. 0
100.0

100

100.0

3-5
6-8
9-12
13-15 +

Total
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learned man would teach those wanting it.

Sometimes they

were taught to read just the Koran, but sometimes they would
practice reading other things as well.
When the refugees were asked why they originally left
Afghanistan, 28 percent answered simply, "Because of the
Russians." Twenty-one percent said, "Because of communism
and its opposition to Islam." Twenty percent said, "Because
of invasion and the war."

And 24 percent said, "Because of

fighting and the attacks."

Of the subjects, four percent

claimed to have left because they had either been put in
jail or were threatened with being jailed.

(See Table VIII.)

Another way to consider these statistics is that almost
half, 49 percent, left for what seemed to be a combination
of safety concerns and ideological reasons.

While I had

hoped to have clear answers distinguishing safety versus
ideological reasons, what became obvious after conducting
the interviews (and based on my observations and field
notes) was that for some the Russians were synonymous with
fears about safety, as they were identified as the source of
the bombing and fighting, while others were ideologically
opposed to the Russians due to communism's opposition to
Islam.

In future research of this type, questions

concerning a foreign occupying force should be broken down
into sub-categories of fear for personal safety and
ideological opposition.

Forty-four percent would appear to

be obvious safety concerns of invasion, war, fighting, and
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attacks.

Unlike other refugee populations around the world,

not a single refugee subject mentioned fleeing his or her

home country for economic considerations.

In sharp

contrast, based on my field notes and interviews and
conversations with Pakistanis, the Pakistanis' general
belief is that in fact the Afghans are there for economic
reasons.
The subjects who were interviewed had left their homes
in Afghanistan anywhere from one year up to ten years before
these interviews took place.

Thirty percent of the

subjects had been refugees for nine to ten years and 74
percent had been refugees for five years or more.

The fact

that such a large population of people have been refugees
for so long causes concern since it appears that the longer
refugees remain out of their home country, the less is their
likelihood return.

(See Table IX.)

Seventy-five percent of the 100 refugees interviewed
were scattered among the 16 refugee camps within Pakistan;
the remaining 25 percent resided in Jamrud tribal area (also
in Pakistan), or in the cities of Peshawar or Quetta or in
the town of Hyadabad.
When asked what their jobs were in Pakistan, 22 percent
said they had none.

Eight percent listed themselves as

leaders, 12 percent were teachers and 48 percent claimed
their job as the Jihad; the remainder fell into other
categories with less than three respondents each.
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TABLE VIII
REASONS FOR LEAVING
Reasons
Given
Russians
Invasion/War
Fighting/Attacks
Communism/
Islam Opposition
Revolution
Jail/Threatened
Other
Total

Frequency

Percent

28
20
24
21

28 ~.o
20.0
24.0
21.0

CUmulative
Percent
28.0
48.0
72.0
93.0

1
4
2

1.0
4.0
2.0

94.0
98.0
100.0

100

100.0

TABLE IX
WHEN DID YOU LEAVE HOME

Year or
1-2
3-4
5-6
7-8
9-10

Years

Frequency

Percent

less
yrs.
yrs.
yrs.
yrs.
yrs.

4
6
16
21
23
30

4.0
6.0
16.0
21.0
23.0
30.0

Total

100

100.0

--

CUmulative
Percent
4.0
10.0
26.0
47.0
70.0
100.0
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When asked what their occupations were in Afghanistan,
23 percent reported being farmers, 24 percent were students,
10 percent were teachers, seven percent were merchants, five
percent were clerks, five percent claimed to be leaders, and
22 percent were scattered among several occupations.
One important consideration affecting repatriation is
whether or not a refugee leaves his family behind or takes
them into refuge as well.

Of the people interviewed, 95

percent had their families with them in Pakistan, only one
percent had part of his family in Pakistan and only four
percent did not have their families with them.
When asked which party the subject belonged to, 20
percent, the largest group, were members of the Hezb-IIslami party run by Moli Halis. Seventeen percent were
members of the party run by Gulbiden Hekmatyer.

Another 17

percent were members of the Mohaz-A-Mili, and 14 percent
belonged to the Jamiat Islami.

The remainder were

distributed among the three other major parties and the five
minor splinter parties.

Contrary to the perception that

party membership is an important part of Afghan life, the
Afghans interviewed seemed not to have a great deal of
concern with regard to which party they belonged.

Many

explained that they had simply joined the party that was in
charge of which ever camp they had settled into or which
their relatives belonged to.
When asked which party should govern in the new Afghan
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government, 34 percent said, "Any Islamic party as long as
it is Islamic."

Twenty-five percent said "Any party," nine

percent said, "All of them should govern," and eight percent
said "None are able to."

Only eight percent of the refugees

stated that, "The party they belonged to should run the new
government in Afghanistan."

I think these answers are

significant to note in that they illustrate the difference
between the western press and leaders' perceptions of party
importance and what the refugees were willing to say.
IN)

When the refugees were asked how important

religious freedom was to them, on a scale of the most
important factor to not a very important factor, 22 percent
said it was the most important, 58 percent said it was very
important, 13 percent said it was important, and three
percent said not as important as other factors.
For the Afghans the term "religious freedom" meant
freedom to practice Islam, not freedom to practice any
religion.
IN)

When asked what help they have received from

Pakistan, 41 percent answered, "They gave us shelter."
"Shelter, aid, and food were given," claimed 18 percent, and
10 percent replied, "They gave us wheat or food."

Often,

after the initial answer, the Afghans would add that in fact
the Pakistanis stole much of the international aid and
relief supplies for their own use.

I believe that this

illustrates some of the underlying tensions and distrust
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that existed between the Afghans and their Pakistani hosts.
When asked if they expected more help from the
Pakistanis after they returned home, 28 percent said, "Yes,"
21 percent did not know, 14 percent said, "Maybe," 13
percent said, "Hopefully," and seven percent answered, "No."
The rest answered in other categories.
The refugees were asked if they thought the Pakistanis
would ever force them to leave.
"No."

Fifty-two percent answered,

Only six percent answered, "Yes."

Eleven percent

said, "It depends on the future government," nine percent
said, "Maybe," and the rest did not answer or did not know.
RP)

Another aspect the refugees were questioned on was

their perception of what would be needed when they returned.
The largest category, 42 percent, gave a long list of
necessities including money, tents, food, tractors, building
materials, and agricultural materials.

The next largest

group, 32 percent, answered, "We need everything."

Ten

percent of the subjects listed immediate needs such as
housewares, utensils, food and clothing.

And finally, nine

percent said, "We need cash."
Essentially, 74 percent indicated that they recognize
that they will need almost everything when they return.
RP)

The refugees were asked what they planned on

taking back with them when they return.
"Everything I have."
have nothing to take."

Forty percent said,

A surprising 27 percent said, " We
This I can verify.

The people I
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visited and especially those with whom I stayed had nothing
but their string beds, a few clothes and some cooking pots
and cooking utensils.

Seventeen percent said they would

take "Clothes, baggages and beds."
RP)

When asked how the refugees would rebuild their

war destroyed homes, 30 percent answered, "International
aid." Twenty one percent said, "Cash," 19 percent said,
"Work and aid."

Twelve percent answered with, "Hard work,"

and eleven percent were hopeful of the United Nations.

The

refugees were then asked what work they would do when they
went home.

Twenty-four percent said they would be farmers,

16 percent said they would work for the government or the
army, 11 percent said they would be students, and five
percent claimed they were too old to work.

Twenty-five

percent listed other occupations.
RP)

With the concerns over possible violence, the

refugees were asked if there would be a problem with bandits
or fighting with all the heavily armed Afghans. Thirty
percent thought there would be such a problem. Twenty-three
percent said, "No problems," while thirty three percent
claimed, "If there is an Islamic government, there will be
no fighting."
RP)
Afghans.

Tribal ties are an important consideration for the
When asked if their whole tribe would return as a

group, eighty percent said, "Yes." Fourteen percent said,
"No, we would go individually."
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When asked who would make the decision when it was time
to go back, 48 percent said, "The leader of the tribe."
Fourteen percent claimed they would decide individually, and
fourteen percent said, "The parties would decide."
RP)

When the refugees were asked how they would return

to Afghanistan, 19 percent said they had walked to Pakistan
and they would walk back to Afghanistan.

Thirty-five

percent said they would go by truck or bus, if they got
help, and by foot if not.

Eighteen percent said that they

would return by bus or truck.

Twenty-two percent said that

they would return in any way, that how was not important.
This is not a naive answer as it first might appear.
Conversations with several journalists and aid workers who
had been inside Afghanistan with the Mujahideen, verified
that most transportation was by foot.

At times hundreds of

miles were covered on foot depending on where groups were
heading.
RP)

In trying to determine which refugees would remain

in Pakistan, the subjects were asked if they thought the
rich Afghans would stay in Pakistan?
said, "No."

sixty-six percent

Thirteen percent said, "Maybe," and nine

percent said, "Yes."

At the same time, the subjects were

asked if they thought the students in the universities in
Pakistan would finish their education before they returned.
Fifty one percent said, "No, they would not finish their
education.

They would return as soon as possible."

Twenty

96

seven percent said, "Yes, the students would stay and finish
their educations," or that, "They should stay for the good
of Afghanistan."

And eleven percent said, "Maybe," or "It

depends on the students."
The refugees were then asked if they knew anyone
personally who would stay in Pakistan?

Eighty-two percent

said, "No," and six percent said, "Yes."
One respondent took me aside after a series of
interviews with other refugees and explained in private that
in fact many refugees would not return home, due to tribal
rivalries or feuds, or because they had established their
business in Pakistan, but that it was not safe to
acknowledge this fact because everyone was expected to
return to their homeland.
Finally, the subjects were asked if someone stays, will
their family stay with them?

Fifty-two percent said, "Yes,"

while 22 percent said, "No." Sixteen percent said "Maybe,"
or "It depends on them."
RP)

In trying to determine certain factors that could

either block or encourage repatriation, the refugees were
asked a series of questions about whether they thought they
would

return under certain situations.

The first of these

questions was, "Will you return before the Russians leave
Afghanistan?"
they would not.

An overwhelmingly ninety-nine percent said
Only one of the subjects said he would

return before the Russians left but this was only so he
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could continue to fight the Russians.
When asked if the refugees would return if the parties
or Mujahideen were fighting for power among themselves,
sixty percent said, "No" and twenty percent said, "Yes, they
would go back to try and stop the fighting."

Eighteen

percent insisted that the Mujahideen and parties would not
fight among themselves as long as there was an Islamic
government.

Many Afghans have been seriously injured by

anti-personnel mines planted in Afghanistan.

When asked if

they would return before the mines were removed, 65 percent
said they would not, while 32 percent said they would go
back, that it was their duty to help remove the mines.
Three percent said, "Maybe," or that they would prefer that
they were removed.
RP)

When considering the make up of the future

government of Afghanistan, the refugees were queried on
whether or not they would return if there was not an Islamic
government.

Ninety-five percent said that they would not

return if there was not an Islamic government.

This

question, when asked, seemed to invoke surprise among the
subjects.

Many would look at me as though I were a somewhat

"backward child" and patiently explain to me in such terms
as, "The whole reason that we are fighting the war is
because we do not have an Islamic government."
Only one person out of the 100 subjects said that he
would return if there was not an Islamic government.
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RP)

The refugees were also asked if they would return

if King Zahir Shah returned from exile and governed
Afghanistan.

Forty-four percent of the refugees claimed

they would not.

Many even said they would fight against him

if he did return; it was his fault that the communists had
gained control in Afghanistan in the first place.

However,

36 percent said they would return, that they supported the
King; and 12 percent claimed that they would return as long
as the King had an Islamic government.
RP)

With the complete destruction of the economic

infrastructure in Afghanistan, it was considered important
to ask if the refugees would return if there were no jobs in
Afghanistan.

Ninety-six percent said, "Yes" they would and

went on to explain to me that they were not fighting the war
or living as refugees because of a concern over jobs, that
the moment the war was over and there was an Islamic
government, they would immediately return home.

It became

apparent, after interviews and conversations with refugee
aid workers in Peshawar and Quetta, that the vast majority
of farms, fields, houses and irrigation systems along border
areas and areas of intense fighting within Afghanistan had
been completely devastated by the Soviets in pursuing their
"scorched earth policy."

Despite what the Afghans said in

interviews, the vast majority have become economic refugees
on top of fleeing for fear of safety or out of ideological
concerns.

What remains to be seen is how the refugees deal
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with their economic losses.

The conversations and open

ended answers indicated that many of the refugees knew their
farms, £ields and houses had been destroyed; in some cases
they were temporarily returning to Afghanistan and
rebuilding or replanting and then returning to Pakistan.
The refugees were also asked if they would return if
there were no schools for their children.

Eighty percent

said "Yes" that they would return whether or not there were
schools: and 18 percent insisted that, "If there was an
Islamic government there would be schools."

Only two people

said that they would not return under those conditions.
RP)

An important concern for the refugees is the make

up of the future government, an issue which I believe is not
sufficiently recognized by the international communities.
When asked if they would return if there was a coalition
government with the communists and the Mujahideen, 80
percent said, "No."

Only 10 percent said "Yes," and this

was only if the Mujahideen held the majority of the power in
the government.
RP)

Since the refugees are so group oriented, they

were asked if their families had the same opinions they were
expressing.

Seventy percent said, "Yes," and only one

person said, "No."
RP)

The remainder qualified their answers.

I felt it necessary to ask if there were any other

important issues that I had not asked about.

Fifty percent

said, "No," while 16 percent said the refugees needed more
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help and aid.

Eleven percent expressed concerns about human

rights and safety.

Ten percent listed concerns about the

political situation.
RP)

The refugees were asked when they thought all the

refugees would go home.

Only four percent actually gave a

time, ranging from two months to a year.

The rest would

only list preconditions which had to be met before the
refugees would leave.

Twenty seven percent said, "When

Allah wishes," or "Allah knows better."

Thirty one

percent said, "When there is an Islamic government and when
the Russians leave."

Six percent said, "When there is peace

and the Russians leave."
What these answers illustrate is that the refugees
don't know or even have a set time themselves, which is a
very frustrating situation if you are a refugee.

More

important is the fact that there are, according to the
refugees interviewed, a number of preconditions which must
be met before they will return.

The most important of these

was the withdrawal of the Russians.

This is obviously not

the only condition as evidenced by the continuing refusal of
the refugees to repatriate.

This listing of preconditions

is tied directly to what Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) had noted
that the more the preconditions the lower the possibility of
the intended behavior actually occurring.

CHAPTER VII
CROSS TABULATION/RELATIONS AMONG VARIABLES
When looking at the relationships among variables it
should be noted that cross tabulations were done only in
those areas identified in the hypotheses as dependent and
independent variables.

The independent variables were:

reason for flight, age of respondent, family status, time in
host country, ideological orientation, geographic distance
or obstacles to return home, economic and socio-cultural
assimilation in the host country, and then a set of personal
perceptions of the refugees, including their perception of
economic opportunities at home, the degree of socio-cultural
similarity with the groups in the area they would be
repatriating to, and finally their fear for personal safety
when they do return.

The dependent variables are the

specific questions formatted as, "Would you return under
these conditions?"

The conditions include: Will you return

to Afghanistan before the Soviet's withdrawal?

Will you

return if the Mujahideen and the Parties are fighting for
power?

Will you return before the removal of the mines?

Would you return if King Zahir Shah ran the government?
Will you return if there are no jobs in Afghanistan?

Will

you return if there are no schools in Afghanistan? and Would
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you return if there was a coalition government with the
communists?
The literature suggests that if the original reason for
flight continues, it will block willingness to repatriate.
This would be a minus, or a push blocking return according
to Bogue (1969) and Lee (1966).

When the reasons for flight

were cross tabulated against a willingness to return before
the Soviets left, of those who fled due to the Russians, 100
percent (N=28) said they would not return before the
Russians withdrew.

It should be noted that overall 99

percent (N=99) of all respondents said they would not return
before the Soviets left, whether they left due to fear for
personal safety or out of opposition to communism.

I

believe that what this illustrates is that opposition to the
Soviets was both ideological as well as relating to fear for
personal safety, in that the Soviets were seen as both the
cause of the threat to safety and as the promoters of
communism.
When the reasons for flight were cross tabbed against a
willingness to repatriate if the Mujahideen and parties were
fighting for power (which would be a minus or a push to keep
refugees from returning), it was found that 89.3 percent
(N=25) of those who said they had fled because of the
Russians would not return if the parties were fighting for
power,

compa~ed

to 55 percent (N=ll) of those who cited the

Russians, war and invasion as their reason for leaving,
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compared to 50 percent (N=12) of those who cited fighting,
aggression and attacks and

42

percent (N=9) of those who

cited communism and its opposition to Islam as their reason
for leaving.

In other words those most willing to return

if the parties were fighting for power, were those who fled
due to communism and its opposition to Islam (ideological
concerns).

This in my view supports the notion that those

who fled for fear of personal safety were less willing to
return if there is still a risk to their safety.

(See Table

x.)

When asked about their concern over mines (which would
be a minus or a push blocking return), 75 percent (N=21) of
those who left because of the Russians said they would not
return if the mines were still in place, compared to 65
percent (N=13) of those who left due to the Russians, war
and invasion, compared to 62.5 percent (N=15) of those who
cited fighting, aggression and attacks, and 61.9 percent
(N=13) of those who cited communism and its opposition to
Islam.

It is interesting to note that

higher proportions

of respondents say they will not return if the mines are
still in place than if the parties were fighting for power.
It would seem that those groups who cited fear for personal
safety as a reason to flee are more concerned about the
mines as a safety issue than the parties fighting for power.
This is probably due to the fact that many people had
already been killed or wounded by the mines, whereas the
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TABLE X
WILL YOU RETURN IF THE PARTIES ARE
FIGHTING CROSS TABULATED WITH
THE REASONS FOR LEAVING
N

Row Percent
Column Percent
Total Percent
Why did you leave
Russians

Yes
1

3.6
5.0
1. 0

Russians and War
5
Invasion or Invaders 25.0

25
1
89.3
3.6
41.7 100.0
25.0
1.0

3

1

15.0
16.7
3.0

5.0
100.0
1. 0

30.0
6.0

12
50.0
20.0
12.0

25.0
33.3
6.0

6
28.6
30.0
6.0

9

6

42.9
15.0
9.0

28.6
33.3
6.0

Fighting, Aggression
6
or Attacks 25.0

Because of Revolution

21
21. 0

1

1

Column
Total

1. 0

1

1

2

25.0
5.0
1. 0

25.0
1. 7
1. 0

50.0
11.1
2.0

Other

1

1

50.0
5.0
1.0

50.0
5.0
1.0

20
20.0

60
60.0

20
20.0

24
24.0

6

100.0
1. 7
1. 0

Put in Jail, or
threatened

Total
28
28.0

1

3.6
5.6
1. 0

11
55.0
18.3
11. 0

25.0
5.0

Communism and its
Opposition to Islam

No

There'll
be no
fighting
with an
Don't
Maybe Islam Gov. now

4

4.0

2

2.0

1

18

1

1. 0

18.0

1.0

100
100.00
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issue of the parties fighting for power after the Soviet
withdrawal was something hypothetical that might take place
in the future.

This finding might also be impacted by the

belief that there would be no fighting among the parties.
Eighteen percent of all the respondents {N=18) refused to
answer this question "Yes" or "No" but would insist that
there would be no fighting if there was an Islamic
government.

One observation recorded in my· field notes was

of the six young men who were brought to me to be
interviewed, each of them had lost a foot or leg or both
feet so recently that blood was still seeping through the
bandages on their stumps.

Many mine victims were simply

killed on the spot or died shortly after their injury.

The

mines were a very real danger and were recognized as such.
{See TABLE XI.)
When asked if they would return if there was not an
Islamic government (which would be a minus or a push
blocking return), only one person said "Yes"; this person
had left because of communism and its opposition to Islam.
One person said "Maybe" under these conditions; this person
had fled because of the Russians.

One person said he would

prefer that there was an Islamic government; this person had
fled due to Russians, war and invasion.
know, and one didn't answer.

One person didn't

The other 95 respondents said

they would not return if there were not an Islamic
government.

I think this illustrates that, even though many
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TABLE XI
WILL YOU RETURN IF THE MINES ARE IN PLACE
CROSS TABULATED WITH THE REASONS
FOR LEAVING AFGHANISTAN
N

Row Percent
Column Percent
Total Percent
Why did you leave
Russians

Yes
7
25.0
21. 9
7.0

No

Maybe

21
75.0

Total

32.3
21. 0

13

1

65.0

18.8
6.0

13.0

5.0
100.0
1. 0

Fighting, Aggression
8
or Attacks 33.3

15
62.5

25.0
8.0

15.0

8
38.1
25.0
8.0

Don't
now

28
28.0

Russians and War
6
Invasion or Invaders 30.0

Communism and its
Opposition to Islam

Would
Prefer

20.3

20
20.0

1

4.2
50.0
1. 0

23.1

24
24.0

21

13

61. 9
20.0

21. 0

13.0

Because of Revolution

1
1. 0

1

100.0
1. 5
1. 0

Put in Jail, or
threatened

3

75.0
9.4
3.0

4

1
25.0
1.5

4.0

1.0

Other

1

1

50.0

50.0
50.0
1. 0

1. 5

1. 0

Column
Total

32
32.0

65
65.0

2

2.0

1

2

100

1.0

2.0

100.00
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of the Afghans have very serious safety concerns,
ideological considerations can be just as important or more
important than safety issues.

However, it is important to

note that, despite what the Afghans I interviewed said, many
aid workers believe that the Afghans would probably return
under a broadly based coalition government.

In an interview

with the Afghan Refugee Commissionerate (a Pakistani), he
insisted that, despite what the Afghans claimed about being
unwilling to accept a non-Islamic government or a coalition
government, as long as there was stability and an end to the
fighting most Afghans would probably return home.
When considering the issue of the Shah, overall 44
percent (N=44) said they would not return if King Zahir Shah
returned to run the government.

These were fairly evenly

distributed among the reasons for flight.

The return of the

Shah is an issue that for some people would be a positive
pull to return or a plus, but for others would be a minus or
a push blocking return.

While recording the open ended

responses, it was common for people to explain that they
would return under Zahir Shah because he was their King and
had the best hope of taking charge of the new government.
Those who opposed the return of Zahir Shah would often add
the comment that they opposed him because he had allowed the
communists to take over and therefore the Afghan war was his
fault.

The issue of the return of Zahir Shah is similar to

that of non-Islamic government.

Even though many
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respondents indicate that they would not return under the
Shah, the Afghan Commissionerate and refugee aid workers in
Peshawar and Quetta insisted in interviews and conversations
that in fact the refugees would probably return even if they
opposed Zahir Shah.
the

s.o.s.

One estimate quoted to me by members of

Belgium group (an aid agency) was that, if Zahir

Shah returned, as many as 90 percent of all refugees would
return, even those who opposed him.
When asked if they would return under a coalition
government, 95 percent (N=95) of the respondents said they
would not return if there was a coalition government between
the Mujahideen and the communists.

The one respondent who

said he would return under a coalition government had fled
because of communism and its opposition to Islam.

One

respondent who fled because of the Russians said maybe he
would return, and one respondent said he would prefer an
Islamic government before he returned.
"No," answer and one "Don't know."
number of responses in

There was also one

Due to the limited

these other categories, the only

conclusion that can be drawn is that the Afghans I spoke to
appeared to feel very strongly about having an Islamic
government.

Again, what the Afghans claim and what I was

told in interviews and conversations with Pakistani, Afghan
and western aid workers were at times contradictory.

Two

UNHCR workers in Peshawar insisted that, except for the
leaders, the political situation did not matter to the
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common people, that as long as there was stability and the
Russians left it did not really matter who ran the future
government.
All of the reasons for flight that were given by the
refugees would fall under Kunz's definition of a "Reactive
Fate Group,"

in that they were reacting to a situation

(Kunz 1981, pg. 44).
If there is a flight of pro-communist supporters out of
Afghanistan with the fall of the communist regime, under
Kunz's scheme they would be a "Self-Fulfilling Purpose
Group" (Kunz 1981, pg. 44).

They would be considered this

in that they were the makers of their own situation.
The first hypothesis would be supported in that the
issues most closely related to the reasons for flight (such
as Soviet presence, a communist government, the possibility
of the parties fighting and the existence of mines) that
still existed were identified by the majority of refugees as
conditions under which they would not return.

I believe

this illustrates that Bogue's and Lee's original contention
about migration would be supported:

that the decision to

migrate is to a certain extent based on the sum of "pluses"
and "minuses" (Lee 1966, pp. 50-52) or "pushes" and "pulls"
(Bogue 1969, pp. 753-754).
Normally it is difficult if not impossible to really
test the relationship between intention and actual behavior
(unless one follows the subjects over time).

I think though
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that, based on what has happened since 1988, and what the
refugees interviewed for this project said, we can assume a
correlation between intention and actual behavior.

Despite

the withdrawal of Soviet forces in February, 1989, twentythree months later the UNHCR estimated that five percent or
less of the refugees had repatriated (based on conversations
with UNHCR personnel).

What this means is that the first

hypothesis would be supported by observable behavior; that
is, the more factors causing flight that still remain, the
less the likelihood of repatriation.

I believe that even

more important is the fact that a number of factors have
arisen since the original causes of flight, and they also
can and have blocked return.

The issue of the parties

fighting or the Shah returning, the removal of the mines,
and economic devastation are just a few examples.
The following cross tabulations using age as an
independent variable are tests of the hypothesis which
states, "The relationship between age and probability of
repatriation is curvilinear."

Age was chosen due to Lee's

identification of it as a way to identify stages in a life
cycle (Lee 1966, pp. 51-52).

When age is used as an

independent variable in determining willingness to
repatriate, there is little or no variation for some
dependent variables.

As stated previously, only one person

said he would return before the withdrawal of the Soviets;
this person was in the 55-64 year old range.

All other
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respondents said they would not return before the Soviets
withdrew.

The responses have so little variation that it is

not possible to support or reject the hypothesis in this
case.
When age was used as the independent variable in
determining whether or not people would return home if the
parties were fighting for power, the highest percentage of
those who said that they would not return home were the
youngest group interviewed.

For the 15-24 year olds 76.2

percent (N=16) said they would not return under these
conditions.

This compares to the 25-34 year old category in

which 59.4 percent (N=19) said they would not return under
these conditions.

Between ages 35 and 44, 70 percent (N=14)

said they would not return.

Between ages 45 and 54, 42.9

percent (N=six) said they would not return if the parties
were fighting.

Fifty percent (N=four) in the 55-64 year old

group said they would not return under these conditions; and
the 65-70 year old group had 20 percent (N=one) who said he
would not.

(See Table XII.)

While on the surf ace there

appears to be a curvilinear relationship, some of the cells
are so small (one or two cases), that one cannot say a clear
relationship exists.

One general relationship that does

come out is that up to age 44 those who say they will not
return if the parties are fighting outnumber those who would
by six to one.

After the age of 45, those who say they will

return and those who say they will not return are almost
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TABLE XII
WILL YOU RETURN IF THE PARTIES ARE FIGHTING
CROSS TABULATED WITH
AGE OF RESPONDENT
N
Row Percent
column Percent
Total Percent
Age

Yes

No

Maybe

There'll
be no
fighting
with an
No
Islam Gov.Answer

Row
Total

15-24

3
14.3
15.0
3.0

16
76.2
26.7
16.0

2
9.5
11.1
2.0

25-34

5
15.6
25.8
5.0

19
59.4
31. 7
19.0

7
21. 9
38.9
7.0

35-44

1
5.0
5.0
1. 0

14
70.0
23.3
14.0

5
25.0
27.8
5.0

20
20.0

45-54

7
50.0
35.0
7.0

6
42.9
10.0
6.0

1
7.1
5.6
1. 0

14
14.0

55-64

3
37.5
15.0
3.0

4
50.0
6.7
4.0

1
12.5
5.6
1. 0

8
8.0

65-70

1
20.0
5.0
1. 0

1
1
20.0
20.0
1.7 100.0
1. 0
1. 0

2
40.0
11. 1
2.0

5
5.0

Column
Total

20
20.0

60
60.0

18
18.0

1
1. 0

21
21. 0

1
3.1
100.0
1. 0

1
1. 0

32
32.0

100
100.0
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evenly divided.

While there does not appear to be a

curvilinear relationship, there appears to be a roughly
increasing willingness to return if the parties are fighting
as one gets older.

Perhaps the older respondents did not

believe the parties would fight, or maybe they did not
believe it would involve them if they did.

Another

consideration is that the younger respondents (between
15-24) have in some cases spent more than half of their
lives in refuge in Pakistan; perhaps they are not as
attached to Afghanistan as those who have lived in their
homeland most of their lives.

These findings would not

support the hypothesis about a curvilinear relationship
between age and willingness to repatriate.
When age was cross tabulated with the question of
whether the refugees would return before the mines were
removed, 61.9 percent (N=13) of the 15-24 age group said
they would not return before the mines were removed, while
65.6 percent (N=21) of the 25-34 age group said they would
not return.

This compares to 75 percent (N=15) of the 35-44

age group who said they would not return, 57.1 percent
(N=eight) of the 45-54 group, 37.5 percent (N=three) of the
55-64 age group, and 100 percent (N=five) of the 65-70 year
old group.

(See Table XIII.)

I believe that this pattern is due to the fact that the
youngest group has no children and are still very
ideologically orientated, while the lower middle and middle
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TABLE XIII
WILL YOU RETURN BEFORE THE REMOVAL OF THE MINES
CROSS TABULATED WITH
AGE OF RESPONDENT
N
Row Percent
Column Percent
Total Percent
Age
15-24

Yes
6
28.6
18.8
6.0

No

1
13
4.8
61. 9
20.0 100.0
13.0
1. 0

34.4
34.4
11. 0

21
.65. 6
32.3
21. 0

35-44

4
20.0
12.5
4.0

15
75.0
23.1
15.0

45-54

6
42.9
18.8
6.0

8
57.1
12.3
8.0

55-64

5
62.5
15.6
5.0

3
37.5
4.6
3.0

25-34

11

65-70

Column
Total

Maybe

Would
Prefer
1
4.8
50.0
1. 0

65
65.0

Row
Total
21
21. 0

32
32.0

1
5.0
50.8
1. 0

20
20.0

14
14.0

8

8.0

5
100.0
7.7
5.0
32
32.0

No
Answer

5
5.0

1
1. 0

2
2.0

100
100.0
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age groups have many dependents.

The upper middle age

group's children are grown adults, while the very elderly
are frail and dependent on their children who have young
children of their own.

Even though this would suggest a

curvilinear relationship, some of the differences between
cells are only one case.

The general conclusion that can be

drawn is that the least willing to return are those between
65-70 followed by those between 35-44.

This would reject

the hypothesis.
Everett

s.

Lee has suggested that besides being related

to stages in a life cycle, age ·may also be related to
dependence in that whereas children are bound to their
parents, when they become older, they might leave the
parents, and become married and soon have children of their
own (Lee 1966, pp. 51-52).

In other words perhaps the

important relationship may be that of one to his or her
dependents.
When age is cross tabbed by willingness to return under
a non-Islamic government, between 90.5 percent and 100
percent of all age groups said they would not return if
there was a non-Islamic government.
support the hypothesis.

These findings do not

The one conclusion that can be

drawn is that most Afghans say that they oppose a nonIslamic government.

Based on the open ended responses

collected during the interviews, it was evident that most of
the Afghans equate a non-Islamic government with a communist
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government.

It should be noted here, as mentioned

previously, that what the Afghan respondents I interviewed
said and what many experts believe they will do are quite
different.
In regard to the relationship between age and
willingness to return if the Shah ran the government, the
distribution of "Yes," "No," "Maybe," and "Yes if he has an
Islamic government," appeared to be randomly distributed,
with no clear pattern.
approval of the Shah.

There is a lot of diversity on the
These findings do not support the

hypothesis op a curvilinear relationship between age and
willingness to return.
When considering age and willingness to return if there
are no jobs, the issue of no jobs at home was one that Sidni
Lamb identified in his study of Ethiopian returnees, who
fled immediately after return due to economic hardship (Lamb
1986, pg. 9).

The only person who said he would not return

if there were no jobs was between 55-64.

Two people from

the 25-34 category said, "Maybe," as well as one person
between 45-54.

The other 96 percent {N=96) said they would

return if there were no jobs.

On this issue there appears

to be a great deal of unanimity among the various age
groups.

Certainly for the 23 percent {N=23) of the

respondents who had been farmers it was a non sequitur; all
they have to do to have jobs is to return home to their
farms and start farming again.

For those who had been
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farmers a common open ended response was, "Sure I will go
back if there are no jobs; I am a farmer and will return to
my fields; that is my job."

Even though the Afghans do not

appear to be concerned about the lack of available jobs, it
is clear from conversations and interviews conducted in
Pakistan with aid workers that Afghanistan has been
economically devastated;

I therefore would question whether

or not returning refugees might return to host countries
once this becomes evident to them as well.

This has

happened to other refugee populations that have returned
home willingly but are unable to stay due to lack of
economic opportunities.

Such was the case among Ethiopian,

Ugandan and Laotian refugees. As Jeff Crisp noted in an
article on Laotian refugees, some fled repeatedly, were
forced to return, and then would flee again immediately
again due to economic hardships (Crisp , September 1987, pp.
27-28).

As a matter of fact many authors have identified

the importance of the economic situation at home (Akol 1987,
pp. 156, Bogue 1969, pp. 753-754).
On the issue of age and willingness to return if there
are no schools, only two people said they would not return
if there were no schools, one was between 35-44 and the
other between 45-54.

The 18 percent (N=18) who said, "If

there is an Islamic government there will be school," were
very evenly distributed among all the age categories.

The

same is true for the 80 percent (N=80) who said they would
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return if there were no schools: they were evenly
distributed among all age groups.

Although the common

answer was that they would return even without schools, it
was often mentioned to me after interviews or in private
conversations that students in school in Pakistan would
probably stay and finish before returning home to
Afghanistan.

One highly educated Afghan (he had a graduate

degree from Oxford) insisted in a private conversation that
he would encourage students to finish their educations
before returning to Afghanistan because educated and
.technically skilled people were desperately needed after the
long and devastating war.
The issue of returning under a coalition government was
very similar to returning if there were no schools: overall
80 percent (N=80) said they would not return under a
coalition government, and the distribution was fairly evenly
divided among the different age categories.

The degree to

which the Afghans opposed the concept of a coalition
government is not a surprising one.

They deeply opposed the

communists on ideological grounds as well as for pragmatic
safety reasons.
strengths.

Compromise is not one of the Afghans' great

They have carried out blood feuds over decades.

They strongly opposed communist involvement in a future
government.

As noted in the beginning on the methods

section, no one believed in 1988 that the communist
government would last, so agreeing to a coalition was not
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necessary.

As Akol (1987, pg. 156), Bogue (1969, pg. 753)

and Kunz (1981, pp. 42-62) pointed out, the political
situation in the home country can create a push to drive
people out or prevent return.
Based on these findings the hypothesis stating that
there would be a curvilinear relationship in regard to age
and willingness to repatriate would be rejected,

although

Lee's original contention about age and stage of life cycle
does seem to have an impact in some areas (Lee 1966, pp. 5152).
The next hypothesis to be tested has to do with family
status and states, "The concerns about safety will vary with
the number of dependents."

This hypothesis attempts to test

whether concerns about safety and reluctance to repatriate
increase with a greater number of dependents.

The issue of

dependency has been identified by numerous authors, most
notably Bogue (1969, pg. 754) and Kunz (1981, pp. 42-46).
To measure the dimension of "family status" marital
status and number of children were utilized.

Age of

youngest child was also collected to see if those with
younger children were more concerned about safety.

When

considering marital status and the effect on willingness to
return before the Soviets withdrew, the only person who said
he would return was a widower.
said they would not return.

The three other widowers

This would not support or

reject the hypothesis because it is so limited.
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When considering marital status cross tabbed with
willingness to return if the parties were fighting, it was
found that 70 percent (N=14) of the single respondents said,
they would not return.

Of the married respondents, 57.9

percent (N=44) indicated they would not return and 50
percent (N=2) of the widowed said they would not return.

A

large proportion of the married men, 22 percent (N=17), felt
there would be no fighting once there was an Islamic
government.

There were only four widowers in the entire

sample, so any conclusions about their unwillingness to
return is not very reliable.

Since so many married men

believed there would be no fighting, they had the smallest
group who actually said, "Yes" they would return.

Of those

who were married, only 18 percent (N=14) said they would
return if the parties were fighting, compared to 25 percent
(N=f ive) of the single men and 25 percent (N=one) of the
widowers.

However, since the number of widowed respondents

was so small, the only reliable comparison is between those
who are married and those who are single.

Those who are

single are more willing to return, which would support the
hypothesis on number of dependents affecting willingness to
return.

(See Table XIV.)

When considering concerns about mines, 60 percent
(N=12) of the single respondents said they would not return
before the mines were removed compared to 65.8 percent
(N=50) of the married and 75 percent (N=three) of the
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TABLE XIV
WILL YOU RETURN IF THE PARTIES ARE FIGHTING
CROSS TABULATED WITH
MARITAL STATUS
N

Row Percent
Column Percent
Total Percent
Marital Status

Yes

No

There'll
be no
fighting
Would with an
Don't
Prefer Islam Gov. Know

Single

5
25.0
25.0
5.0

14
70.0
23.3
14.0

1
5.0
5.6
1. 0

Married

14
18.4
70.0
14.0

44
57.9
73.3
44.0

17
22.4
94.4
17.0

Widowed

1
25.0
5.0
1. 0

2
50.0
3.3
2.0

1
25.0
100.0
1. 0

Column
Total

20
20.0

60
60.0

1. 0

1

Row
Total
20
20.0

1
1. 3

76
76.0

100.0
1. 0
4
4.0

18
18.0

1
1. 0

100
100.0
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widowed respondents.

The single are slightly more willing

to return than those who are married, which would support
the hypothesis about willingness to return and number of
dependents.

(See Table XV.)

For the safety issues of the withdrawal of the
Russians, the parties fighting for power and the removal of
the mines, the findings would support the hypothesis that
those with dependents are less willing to return than those
without dependents.
To further test the hypothesis on willingness to return
and the relationship to number of dependents, the number of
children and age of youngest child are compared to
willingness to return.
The one person who was willing to return under the
Russians had six children.

This is too limited to draw any

conclusions.
When checking how dependents affected willingness to
repatriate if the parties were fighting amongst themselves
for power, 69 percent (N=l8} of the people without children
said they would not return under this circumstance, 66.7
percent (N=six) of those with one child said they would not
return, 70 percent (N=seven) of those with two children said
they would not.

This compares to 33.3 percent (N=two) of

those with three children, 72.7 percent (N=eight) of those
with four children, 80 percent (N=eight) of those with five
children, 55.6 percent (N=five) of those with six children,
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TABLE

xv

WILL YOU RETURN BEFORE THE REMOVAL OF THE MINES
CROSS TABULATED WITH
MARITAL STATUS
N
Row Percent
Column Percent
Total Percent
Marital Status

Yes

No

Single

8
40.0
25.0
8.0

12
60.0
18.5
12.0

Married

23
30.3
71.9
23.0

50
65.8
76.9
50.0

Widowed

1
25.0
3.1
1. 0

3
75.0
4.6
3.0

Column
Total

32
32.0

65
65.0

Maybe

Would
Prefer

No
Answer

Row
Total
20
20.0

1
1. 3

100.0
1. 0

2
2.6
100.0
2.0

76
76.0

4
4.0

1
1. 0

2
2.0

100
100.0
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and 31.6 percent (N=six) of those with seven or more
children who said they would not return if the parties were
fighting for power.

While it appears that as the number of

children increases, concerns about parties fighting
increases up to five children where it starts to decrease,
it should be noted that those with six or more children had
22 percent (N=two) of their group which believed that there
will be no fighting under an Islamic government as did those
who had seven or more children which had 26.3 percent
(N=five) of their group that did not believe there would be
any fighting.

These findings would not support the

hypothesis in regards to number of dependents affecting
willingness to return.

I think that the real relationship

being illustrated here is a function of the respondents'
age.

Those who were in their teens and early twenties up to

those who were in their late forties and early fifties were
the least willing to return under these conditions.

Those

who were 55 and older were increasingly more willing to
return under these conditions.

One possibility is that the

older Afghans have older children and do not view the safety
issues the same way as those with primarily younger children
do.
When the same people were asked if they would return
before the mines were removed from the country, 61.5 percent
(N=16) of those without children said they would not return
before the mines were removed; this group was also the

125
youngest of all respondents. Of those with one child, 33.3
percent (N=three) said they would not return before the
removal of the mines.

This compares to 70 percent (N=seven)

of those with two children, 83.3 percent (N=five) of those
with three children, 72.7 percent (N=eight) of those with
four children, 80 percent (N=eight) of those with five
children, 55.6 percent (N=five) of those with six children,
and 68.4 percent (N=13) of those with seven or more
children, who said they would not return.
The variation here does not appear to follow any
general pattern in relationship to the increasing number of
dependents.

This would not support the hypothesis about

number of dependents affecting willingness to return.
When using number of dependents, and the effect on
willingness to return if there is not an Islamic government,
the one person who said he would return if there was not an
Islamic government had six children.

This is so limited

that it cannot be used to test this hypothesis.
To see if number of dependents affected willingness to
return in areas other than safety issues, some other
relationships were tested.
The effect of number of children on willingness to
return under the Shah had a lot of variation among the
responses.

Of those with no children 53.8 percent (N=14)

did not want to return under the Shah.

Those with one child

had 77.8 percent (N=7) of their group who said they would
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not return under the Shah; but then the next group, those
with two children, had only 30 percent (N=three) saying they
would not return under the Shah.

This compares to those

with three children in which 66.7 percent (N=four) said they
would not return, those with four children in which 27.3
percent (N=three) said they would not, those with five
children where 40 percent {N=four) said they would not,
those with six children where 22.2 percent {N=two) who said
they would not, and those with seven or more children where
36.8 percent {N=seven) said they would not return under the
Shah.

There does not appear to be any relationship between

number of dependents and willingness to return under the
Shah.

The return of the Shah does not appear to be

considered a safety issue but an ideological one.

There is

a great deal of diversity on this answer.
When looking at the effect the number of dependents has
on willingness to return if there are no jobs in
Afghanistan, the only respondent who said he would not
return if there were no jobs, had seven or more children.
Three respondents said maybe they would return if there were
no jobs; they had, respectively, two children, four children
and six children.

This is one topic in which there is so

much unanimity that it is difficult to discern any pattern
The effect of number of children on willingness to
return if there is no schools is an interesting one.

There

were two respondents who said they would not return if there
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were no schools, one had no children and the other had six
children.

Out of all the respondents, 80 percent (N=80)

said they would return if there were no schools.

The other

category had 18 percent (N=l8) who said that if there was an
Islamic government there would be schools.

These

respondents were fairly evenly distributed among all
categories of number of dependents.

The one category which

stood out were those with seven or more children.

From this

group, 42 percent (N=eight) said that if there was an
Islamic government there would be schools.
When looking at the effect of number of children on
willingness to return if there is a coalition government,
those who said they would not return under a coalition
government were fairly evenly distributed among the various
categories of numbers of children.

Overall 80 percent

(N=80) said they would not return under these conditions,
and among the various categories it ran from a high of 100
percent (N=six) of those with three children to a low of
45.5 percent (N=five) among those with four children.
When considering safety and willingness to return based
on number of dependents, since the one person who would
return under the Russians had a child, and there was no
clear relationship for number of children and returning if
the parties are fighting or before the removal of the mines,
this hypothesis would not be supported based on the answers
given by the respondents I interviewed.

I feel though that
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this is an area that would benefit from further research.
One drawback to the previous hypothesis test was that
people would say yes they had children even if the children
were in their twenties.

For the Afghans a person in his/her

late teens is a young adult, so they are probably not seen
in the same way as young children.

To further test this

hypothesis, age of youngest child was used to see if the
issue of dependency and its relationship to willingness to
migrate might be correlated as Bogue had described in his
work {1969}.
When looking at the age of the youngest child

and how

this affects willingness to return under the Russians, a
respondent with the youngest child between 15-18 was the
only person who said he would return before the Russians
left.

This is too limited to draw any conclusions.
When using the child's age as the independent variable

influencing the willingness to return if the parties were
fighting, it was found that 62 percent (N=31} of those whose
youngest children were five years old or less were not
willing to return if the parties were fighting for power,
compared to 54.5 percent {N=six} of those with a youngest
child of 6-10 and 33.3 percent {N=two} of those with a
youngest child of 11-14. {See Table XVI.}

Therefore as the

youngest child's age increases so does the willingness to
return if the parties are fighting for power.

Of the

respondents who had their youngest child between 15-18 and
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TABLE XVI
WILL YOU RETURN IF THE PARTIES ARE FIGHTING
CROSS TABULATED WITH AGE
OF YOUNGEST CHILD
N

Row Percent
Column Percent
Total Percent
Child's Age
none

Yes

No

Maybe

There'll
be no
fighting
with an
Islam Gov

Don't
Know

Row
Total

6
23.1
30.0
6.0

18
69.2
30.0
18.0

2
7.7
11.1
2.0

5 or less

6
12.0
30.0
6.0

31
62.0
51. 7
31. 0

12
24.0
66.7
12.0

6-10

3
27.3
15.0
3.0

6
54.5
10.0
6.0

2
18.2
11.1
2.0

11
11. 0

11-14

2
33.3
10.0
2.0

2
1
33.3
16.7
3.3 100.0
2.0
1. 0

1
16.7
5.6
1. 0

6
6.0

15-18

1
50.0
5.0
1. 0

1
50.0
1. 7
1. 0

19-22

1
25.0
5.0
1. 0

2
50.0
3. 3
2.0

23 +

1
100.0
5.0
1. 0

Column
Total

20
20.0

26
26.0

1
2.0
100.0
1. 0

50
50.0

2
2.0

4
4.0

1
25.0
5.6
1. 0

1
1.0

60
60.0

1
1. 0

18
18.0

1
1. 0

100
100.0
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those whose youngest child was between 19-22, 50 percent
said they would not return if the parties were fighting for

power; however, there were only one or two respondents in
each of the respective cells, so it is very inconclusive for
those with children above the age of 15.

Even though this

finding is inconclusive due to the limited number of cases
of youngest child above the age of 11, I believe that it is
worth noting in that it indicates the possibility that this
hypothesis may be correct.
As the youngest

child'~

age increases, so does the

parent's willingness increase slightly to repatriate if
there are still mines in Afghanistan.

Sixty-eight percent

(N=34) of those with children five or less said they would
not return under these conditions; 63.6 percent (N=seven) of
those with children six to 10 said, "No," and 66.7 percent
(N=4) of those with children 11-14 said, ''No."

Those with

children 15-18 said, "No," 50 percent (N=one) of the time.
Due to the limited number of cases it is impossible to draw
any reliable conclusions for those with children between 1118.

(See Table XVII.)
These findings are very limited, but I believe they

indicate that the hypothesis about family status and
willingness to repatriate may be supported with further
research.

This would support Bogue's identification of this

as a factor affecting migration (1969).
Issues other than safety were checked to see if they
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TABLE XVII
WILL YOU RETURN BEFORE THE REMOVAL OF THE MINES
CROSS TABULATED WITH AGE
OF YOUNGEST CHILD
N
Row Percent
Column Percent
Total Percent
Child's Age
none

Yes

No

Maybe

Would
Pref er

Row
No
Answer Total

9
34.6
28.1
9.0

16
61. 5
24.6
16.0

5 or less

14
28.0
43.8
14. 0

34
68.0
52.3
34.0

6-10

4
36.4
12.5
4.0

7
36.6
10.8
7.0

11
11. 0

11-14

2
33.3
6.3
2.0

4
66.7
6.2
4.0

6
6.0

15-18

1
50.0
3. 1
1. 0

1
50.0
1. 5
1. 0

2
2.0

19-22

1
25.0
3. 1
1. 0

3
75.0
4.6
3.0

4
4.0

23 +

1
2.0
100.0
1. 0

1
3.8
50.0
1. 0

26
26.0

1
2.0
50.0
1. 0

50
50.0

1

1

1. 0

100.0
3. 1
1. 0
Column
Total

32
32.0

65
65.0

1
1. 0

2
2.0

100
100.0
------·--·--
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were impacted as well.

There is very little variation in

willingness to return under a coalition government when
cross tabbed with age of youngest child.

The one respondent

who said he would return had a child less than five; there
was also one respondent with a child between six and 10 who
said maybe he would return under a coalition government.
An interesting trend is noticed in the relationship

between the youngest child's age and willingness to return
if the Shah returned to run the government in Afghanistan.
Forty six percent (N=23) of those with children five or less
said they would not return under these conditions.

Thirty-

six percent (N=four) of those with youngest children between
six to 10 said, "No," and only 16.7 percent (N=one) of those
with youngest children between 11-14 said, "No."

A more

reliable indicator (due to larger number of respondents) is
those who said, "Yes they would return if the Shah returned
to run the government."

Of those with youngest children

five or less 34 percent (N=17) said yes they would return.
Of those with youngest children between six to 10, 45.5
percent (N=f ive) said they would return and of those with
youngest children between 11-14, 66.7 percent (N=four) said
they would return.

Between 15-18 there was only one

respondent, too small to be reliable.

(See Table XVIII.)

As the age of youngest child increases the willingness
to return under the Shah does too.
When considering youngest child's age and the
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TABLE XVIII
WILL YOU RETURN IF THE SHAH RETURNS
CROSS TABULATED WITH AGE
OF YOUNGEST CHILD
N
Row Percent
Column Percent
Total Percent
Child's Age

Yes, i f
there
is an
I'll
Islamic Fight
Hirn
Gov.

No

Maybe

7
26.9
19.4
7.0

14
53.8
31. 8
14.0

3
11. 5
50.0
3.0

1
3.8
8.3
1. 0

5 or less

17
34.0
7.2
17.0

23
46.0
52.3
23.0

2
4.0
33.3
2.0

7
14.0
58.3
7.0

6-10

5
45.5
13.9
5.0

4
36.4
9.1
4.0

11-14

4
66.7
11.1
4.0

1
16.7
2. 3
1. 0

15-18

1
50.0
2.8
1. 0

1
50.0
2. 3
1. 0

19-22

1
25.0
2.8
1. 0

1
25.0
2. 3
1. 0

none

23 +

Column
Total

Yes

Don't
Know

1
3.8
100.0
1. 0

26
26.0

1
2.0
100.0
1. 0

2
18.2
16.7
2.0

50
50.0

11
11. 0

6
6.0

1
16.7
16.7
1. 0

2
2.0

4
4.0

2
50.0
16.7
2.0

1
100.0
2.8
1.0
36
36.0

Row
Total

1.

44
44.0

6
6.0

12
12.0

1.

1
0

1.

1
0

100
1
0 100.0
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willingness to return if there are no jobs, there is very
little variation.

The one respondent who said he would

return if there were no jobs had a youngest child between
15-18.

Two people who had youngest children less than five

said maybe they would return if there were no jobs.

Also,

one person with a youngest child between 6-10 said maybe
they would return.

The other 96 percent (N=96) said they

would return if there were no jobs.
When asked if they would return if there were no
schools, only two people said they would not return, one
with no children and one who had a youngest child who was
five or. less.

Many with children, believed that if there

was an Islamic government, that there would be schools.

Of

those with children five or less, 22 percent (N=ll) said
there would be schools if there was an Islamic government.
Of those with youngest children between six to 10, 36.4
percent (N=f our) said there would be schools if there was an
Islamic government.
There appears to be little effect of children's age on
the willingness to repatriate if there is a coalition
government.

Of those with youngest children five or less,

74 percent (N=37) said they would not return if there was a
coalition government.

Of those with youngest children

between 6-10, 90.9 percent (N=lO) said they would not
return.

For those with youngest children between 11-14,

83.3 percent (N=five) said they would not return.

Those
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with youngest children between 15-18 were 100 percent
{N=two) opposed to returning under a coalition.

The same is

true for those with the youngest child between 19-22 and
over the age of 23, in that they were very opposed to
returning (75 percent to 100 percent) but there were only
three or one cases in each cell.
The next hypothesis to be tested states, "The greater
the time that a refugee spends out of the home country the
less the likelihood of repatriation."

The refugees in this

study were asked when they fled and this was then compared
to their willingness to repatriate under certain conditions.
The effect of when a respondent fled on their
willingness to return before the soviets left is not
possible to determine since only one respondent said he
would return before the Soviets withdrew.

That person had

been in exile for 3-4 years.
When looking at the effect time in refuge has on a
willingness to repatriate, there appears to be little
relationship to the matter of whether the parties are
fighting for power.

Overall 60 percent {N=60) said they

would not return if the parties were fighting.

Comparing

the different categories of those who had been out of
Afghanistan for various times and said they would not return
ranged from a high of 75 percent to a low of 43 percent with
no discernible pattern.

The same situation exists for when

someone left and if they are willing to return before the
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mines are removed.

Those who said they would not return

before the mines were removed based on when they left,
varies from 57 percent to 75 percent, with no discernible
pattern.

The one person who was willing to return if there

was not an Islamic government had left Afghanistan between
nine to 10 years before.

Willingness to return under the

Shah and the length of time as a refugee shows an
interesting relationship.

Of those who had been refugees

only one year or less 75 percent (N=three) said they would
not return if the Shah came back, compared to 67 percent
(N=four) of those in refuge for one to two years, 69 percent
(N=ll) of those who had left three to four years before, 38
percent (N=eight) of those who had left five to six years
before, 39 percent (N=ll) of those who had left seven to
eight years before, and only 30 percent (N=nine) of those
who had left nine to 10 years before.

The longer people had

been out of the country the more willing they were to return
under the Shah.

(See Table XVIII!.)

The effect of the length of time that someone had been
out of the country on willingness to return if there are no
jobs available is not possible to discern because only one
person said he would not return if there were no jobs.
person had left the country five to six years before.

This
Two

people who had been out of the country seven to eight years
said, "Maybe" they would return and one person who had been
out of the country nine to 10 years said he maybe would
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TABLE xv Iv
WILL YOU RETURN IF THE SHAH RETURNS
CROSS TABULATED WITH WHEN
RESPONDENT FLED
N

Row Percent
Column Percent
Total Percent
When Did You Flee
1 year

Yes

No

Maybe

3
75.0
6.8
3.0

1-2 years

1
16.7
2.8
1. 0

4
66.7
9.1
4.0

1
16.7
16.7
1. 0

3-4 years

3
18.8
8.3
3.0

11
68.8
25.0
11. 0

1
6.3
16.7
1. 0

5-6 years

6
28.6
16.7
6.0

8
38.1
18.2
8.0

7-8 years

7
30.4
19.4
7.0

9-10 years

18
60.0
50.0
18.0
36
36.0

Don't
Know

Row
Total
4
4.0

1
25.0
2.8
1. 0

Column
Total

Yes, if
he has
I
Will
an
Islamic Fight
Him
Gov.

6
6.0

1
6.3
8.3
1. 0

16
16.0

1
4.8
16.7
1. 0

6
28.6
50.0
6.0

21
21. 0

9
39.1
20.5
9.0

2
8.7
33.3
2.0

4
17.4
33.3
4.0

9
30.0
20.5
9.0

1
3.3
16.7
1. 0

1
3. 3
8.3
1. 0

44
44.0

6
6.0

12
12.0

1
4. 3
100.0
1. 0

23
23.0

1
3.3
100.0

30
30.0

1
0

100
1
1.0 100.0

1.
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return if there were no jobs.

When this group was asked if

they would return if there were no schools, only two people
said, "No."

One, had left Afghanistan three to four years

before; the other had left five to six years before.

The

other category were those who answered, "If there is an
Islamic government, there will be schools."

Those who

answered in this category were fairly evenly distributed
between all of the various categories of time out of the
country.

This same group when asked about the willingness

to repatriate under a coalition government roughly showed
increasing willingness to do so the longer they had been out
of the country: 100 percent (N=four) of those who had fled
that year said they would not return under a coalition
government, compared to 83.3 percent (N=five) of those who
had fled one to two years before, 93.8 percent (N=15) of
those who had fled three to four years before, 76.2 percent
(N=16) of those who had fled five to six years before, 87
percent (N=20) of those who fled seven to eight years before
and 67.7 percent (N=20) of those who had fled nine to 10
years before saying they would not return under a coalition
government.

(See Table XX.)

This was an interesting finding

in that it appears to reject the hypothesis that people
would be less likely to repatriate the longer they were out
of the country.

This would support the position of Crisp in

regards to the importance of time, but in the opposite way
from that which he described (1987).

However, it could
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TABLE

xx

WILL YOU RETURN UNDER A COALITION GOVERNMENT
CROSS TABULATED WITH WHEN
RESPONDENT FLED
N
Row Percent
Column Percent
Total Percent
When Did You Flee

I

Will
If

Yes

No

1 year
or less

4
100.0
5.0
4.0

1-2 years

5
83.0
6.3
5.0

Others
Don't
No
Maybe Do
Other Answer Know

4
4.0

1
16.7
100.0
1. 0

3-4 years

1
6.3
10.0
1. 0

15
93.8
18.8
15.0

5-6 years

2
9.5
20.0
2.0

16
1
1
76.2
4.8
4.8
20.0 100.0 100.0
16.0
1. 0
1. 0

7-8 years

9-10 years

Column
Total

20
66.7
25.0
20.0

10
10.0

80
80.0

6
6.0

16
16.0

20
87.0
25.0
20.0
7
23.3
70.0
7.0

Row
Total

1
4. 3
100.0
1. 0

1
1. 0

1
1.0

1
1. 0

1
4.8
16.7
1. 0

21
21. 0

2
8.7
3 3. 3
2.0

23
23.0

3
10.0
50.0
3.0

30
30.0

6
6.0

100
1
1.0 100.0
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indicate also that people are less and less concerned about
the conditions at home because they have less and less
intention to return and hence are willing to say they would
return no matter what.

Another possibility is that the

longer the Afghans were in refuge the more desperate they
were to return home under any condition.

This is possibly

related to the "Ideological National Orientation Abroad" as
identified by Kunz (1981, pp. 44-46}.

Those who maintain a

homeward orientation and do not become eager
assimilationists may in fact find time to be an intervening
variable which works as a "push" to return home instead of
roadblock to return.

The longer the "homeward oriented

view" (Kunz 1981, pg. 44} refugee remains in refuge the more
frustrated and determined the refugee becomes to eventually
repatriate.
Tied to the issue of time is the hypothesis that the
general population over time will become more pragmatic in
their concerns, while the leadership will become more
ideological in their concerns (Crisp 1987, Kunz 1981).

As

has been noted earlier only one person was willing to return
before Soviet withdrawal; he had been out of the country
three to four years.

In regards to whether the parties were

fighting for power or the mines had not been removed there
did not appear to be any relationship to how long the
general population had been out of the country.
If there was not an Islamic government the two people
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who said, "Yes" or "Maybe" they would return, had been out
of the country for nine to 10 years, which is interesting
but so limited in numbers that all one can suggest is that
it warrants further investigation.
With regards to the hypothesis that pragmatic concerns
would increase over time in refuge, people seem to be more
willing to accept the Shah and a coalition government the
longer they had been in refuge.

The issues of returning

with no schools or no jobs or a non-Islamic government
indicate that people might be more pragmatic over time but
if they are it is a very slight increase and needs further
research.

There doesn't appear to be any increase over fear

of parties fighting or of mines over time.

For this

hypothesis, one can not accept or reject it at this point.
Further studies are needed to see if people do become more
pragmatic.
When comparing those in positions of leadership (tribal
leaders and commanders), all but one of the eight leaders
had been out of the country for eight to ten years.

One

leader had been out of Afghanistan for four years.
Unfortunately the sample of leaders was not large enough to
detect any significant variation over time.

Statistically

the categorized answers of the leaders were not
significantly different from those of the everyday people.
However, when referring to field notes made following the
interviews of five commanders and leaders over a several day
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period, I had noted that in the open ended responses and
conversations the leaders were very dogmatic and very
insistent about the importance of Islam and the removal of
the Russians.

They also were the most insistent that there

would never be fighting between the parties and that a
coalition government would never be formed.

While some

answers of the general people seem to indicate a pragmatic
shift over time, not enough data were collected to determine
a shift among the leaders.

However, the leaders certainly

seemed to be more ideological, based on observations and
conversations.

While this might indicate the possibility of

a relationship, further research is needed.
Geographic obstacles have been noted as a feature that
can block flight or repatriation.

Lee noted the importance

of geographic obstacles in his work in 1966 as an
intervening variable.

The next hypothesis to be tested

states, "The greater the distance or other geographic
obstacles, the less the likelihood of repatriation."
case of the Afghans, distance is such an obstacle.

In the
For ease

of analysis and comparison the provinces that the Afghans
fled from will be broken down into those that are on the
border with Pakistan or adjacent to provinces on the border
and those that are not.

Those that are on the border or

very close to it and which respondents to this survey fled
from are: Kabul, Ningrahar, Qandahar, Helmand, Laghman,
Logar, and Paktia.

Those provinces that respondents came

143
from that are not on the border or close to it are Jowzjan,
Uruzgan, Kunduz and Kapisa.
When looking at those who would be willing to return
before the Soviets left, the one person who said, "Yes" was
from Kabul, which is both adjacent to a border province and
has a major road leading to it.
When looking at the issue of who would return if the
parties are fighting, the one respondent from Jowzjan, the
one respondent from Uruzgan, one of the three respondents
from Kunduz, and the one respondent from Kapisa all said
they would not return under these conditions.

Of

respondents from the non border areas between 33.3 percent
and 100 percent said they would not return under these
conditions (three-fourths of the non border provinces had
100 percent of their respondents who would not return).

The

respondents from the areas close to the border said they
would not return at a low of 44.4 percent (N=four) from
Logar and a high from Kabul of 63.6 percent (N=14) of the
time.

Because there were only one, two or three respondents

from the outlying provinces, it is not possible to draw a
firm conclusion about geographic distance determining
willingness to repatriate.

However, it can certainly be

taken as a good possibility that geographic distance affects
willingness to repatriate, and it needs to be recognized
that this issue warrants further research.
When looking at where people fled from and how that
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affects their willingness to repatriate if there are still
mines, the respondent from Jowzjan, the respondent from
Uruzgan, two of the three respondents from Kunduz, and the
one respondent from Kapisa all said they would not return if
there were still mines.

In other words between 66.7 percent

and 100 percent of those from the outlying provinces said
they would not return.

Between 33.3 percent and 100 percent

of respondents from border areas said they would not return.
The same situation applies here in that the numbers away
from the border areas are very small, but it indicates there
might be a relationship, and further research should be
conducted.
While 95 percent (N=95) said they would not return if
there was not an Islamic government, all respondents from
the provinces not close to the border said they would not
return if there was not an Islamic government.
There didn't appear to be any pattern at all in regards
to where people were from and whether or not they would
return if the Shah returned to run the government.
Willingness to return if there were not jobs in
Afghanistan didn't seem to be impacted by where people were
from.

Except for people from Ningrahar (a border province)

all other respondents said they would return if there were
no jobs.

Of those from Ningrahar, one said, "No" he would

not return and three said, "Maybe" they would return if
there were no jobs.
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When considering how area fled from affected
willingness to return if there were no schools,
interestingly all of the respondents from provinces away
from the border said that even if there were no schools they
would return.

The only respondents who said they would not

return were from border provinces, but only two respondents
said this.

The other answer that those from border

provinces gave was that, if there is an Islamic government
there will be schools.

Twenty percent overall answered this

way.
When considering how the distance one fled from affects
their willingness to return if there is a coalition
government, of those who fled from the four non border
provinces, 83.3 percent (N=five) said they would not return
if there was a coalition government.

This is about the same

as the response of those from border areas, of whom 85.2
percent (N=75) said they would not return.
Another geographic consideration is whether people fled
from a rural area or from Kabul (the one urban area).

The

respondents from Kabul, as compared to other areas, showed
no noticeable difference between Kabul and the rural
provinces.

While the findings are extremely limited due to

the majority being from the border provinces, I believe the
responses do indicate the possibility that the hypothesis
about the greater the geographic obstacles the less the
likelihood of repatriation could be supported with further
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research.

This would support Lee's (1966) view of

importance of intervening obstacles.
Another hypothesis to consider is: the greater the
degree of economic assimilation in the host country the less
the likelihood of repatriation (if they have jobs in the
host country they will be less likely to repatriate).

As

has been noted, many authors have identified the importance
of economics as an important factor in affecting migration
(Akol 1987, pg. 156, Lamb 1986, pg. 9).

Donald Bogue {1969)

has further identified econbmic opportunities in the host
country as an important pull into the host country for
·migrants.

As has been mentioned previously, only one person

said he would return before the Soviets withdrew; this
person had a job.
Of those who had jobs, 76.1 percent (N=48) said that
they would not return if the parties were fighting for
power; this compares to 54.5 percent (N=l2} of those not
having jobs saying they would not return.

Whether or not

one has a job does seem to affect willingness to return if
the parties were fighting for power.

This would support the

hypothesis.
When considering the effect of someone having a job on
willingness to return if there are still mines, 63.6 percent
(N=14) of those without jobs said they would not return
compared to 67.1 percent (N=51) of those with jobs.

Because

of the number of cases this is a small difference but it
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could indicate a relationship here.

This would support the

hypothesis.
Whether or not someone had a job did not seem to impact
their willingness to return if there was not an Islamic
government.

All of those without jobs (100 percent, N=22)

said that they would not return if there was not an Islamic
government.

The one person who said he would return if

there was not an Islamic government had a job.

This would

not support the hypothesis, but is so limited it is
insignificant.
Those without jobs were more willing to return if the
Shah returned to power than those with jobs.

Of those with

no job in Pakistan 40.9 percent (N=nine) said they would not
return if the Shah returned to power, compared to 57.4
percent (N=35) of those with jobs.

This would support the

hypothesis.
When asked if they would return if there were no jobs
in Afghanistan the only person who said, "No," did not have
a job in Pakistan.

Ninety-six percent (N=96) said they

would return, and three people with jobs said, "Maybe" they
would return.

This would not support the hypothesis.

Whether or not people had jobs in Pakistan did not seem
to affect their willingness to return if there were no
schools, only two people said they would not return if there
were no schools and they did have jobs; and 18 percent
(N=18) said if there was an Islamic government there would
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be schools.

This was fairly evenly distributed among those

with and without jobs.

All the other respondents said they

would return if there were no schools.

This would not

support the hypothesis.
Whether or not one had a job in Pakistan only slightly
effected willingness to return under a coalition government.
Eighty-two percent (N=18) of those without jobs said they
would not return under a coalition government.

This

compared to 89.8 percent (N=62) of those with jobs saying
they would not return.

While there is a slight difference,

it is accounted for by only two cases, so is not
significant.

This would not support or disprove the

hypothesis.
The hypothesis that the greater the degree of economic
assimilation, the less the likelihood of repatriation, would
be supported for the issues of whether the parties were
fighting, mines were present, or the Shah returned to run
the government which would support Bogue's (1969)
identification of this as an important "pull."

This

hypothesis would not be supported for the issues of
returning if there are no jobs or no schools, and it is not
supported for the issues of the withdrawal of the Soviets
and a non Islamic government or a coalition government.

It

should be noted that these non supporting matters have a
high degree of unanimity among the respondents and probably
were ideological responses.

Therefore these responses might
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not be significant in not supporting this hypothesis.
Next we will consider the hypothesis that the less the
socio-cultural similarity with the host society the greater
the likelihood of repatriation.
six categories of ethnic groups.

There were respondents from
However, only two had more

than one respondent in a particular ethnic group, these two
being the two largest groups in Afghanistan and the majority
of those in refuge in Pakistan.
Pushtuns and the Tajiks.

The two groups were the

The Pushtun category had 83

respondents while the Tajik had 13.

Both the Pushtuns and

the Tajiks fled to and settled in Pushtun areas.

These two

groups will be compared to determine willingness to return
from a similar ethnic group area and a non-similar ethnic
group area.
The only person who was willing to return under the
Soviets was a Pushtun.

While 22.9 percent (N=19) of the

Pushtuns were willing to return if the parties were fighting
for power, none of the Tajiks were.

This would not support

the hypothesis.
If mines were still present, 61.4 percent (N=51) of the
Pushtuns said they would not return.

However 84.6 percent

(N=ll) of the Tajiks said they would not return.

This would

not support the hypothesis.
The one respondent who said he would return under a
non-Islamic government was Pushtun, while all Tajiks said
they would not return under these conditions.

Like the
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issue of the Soviets, this is too limited to draw any
conclusions.
The Pushtuns and the Tajiks were both about equally
opposed to the Shah.

Whereas 45.8 percent (N=38) of the

Pushtuns said they would not return under the Shah, 46.2
percent (N=6) of the Tajiks said they would not return.
When asked if they would return if there were no jobs, the
only person who said, "Yes," was a Tajik, three Pushtuns
said, "Maybe," and everyone else said, "Yes they would
return if there were no jobs."
When asked if they would return if there were no
schools the only people who answered, "No," were two
Pushtuns.

Fifteen Pushtuns also said that if there were an

Islamic government there would be schools, as did three
Tajiks.
When asked if they were willing to return under a
coalition government, 79.5 percent (N=66) of the Pushtuns
said, "No," 84.6 percent (N=ll) of the Tajiks said, "No,"
one said, "Maybe," one said he would accept it if others
did.
This hypothesis would be not be supported.

Except for

returning if there were no schools or under the Shah, the
Pushtuns are more willing to return than the Tajiks.

It is

possible that what is really being measured here is
respondents' geographic proximity to the area they are from
or that since Afghanistan has been traditionally dominated
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by the Pushtuns politically they are more willing to return
to a country in which they are dominant.
The hypothesis covering the personal perception
variable of economic opportunity says that someone who has
greater economic opportunity at home but no work in Pakistan
would be more willing to repatriate.

However, only one

respondent said that he not would return if there were no
jobs.

This person did not have a job in Pakistan and was a

farmer in Afghanistan.

The other 21 respondents who did not

have jobs in Pakistan said they would return if there were
not jobs in Afghanistan.

Of those with jobs all but three

said they would return if there were no jobs; three people
with jobs said, "Maybe," they would return if there were no
jobs.

This is an area that certainly needs more research

but at this point one would have to say that this hypothesis
is not supported.

As had been noted earlier, even though

the refugees may honestly plan on returning, due to the
extensive devastation (based on UNHCR workers' surveys in
Afghanistan)

there is a possibility that there may be

return refugees after the initial repatriation, as observed
by Jeff Crisp (September 1987) in his study of Laotian
refugees.
Considering the personal perception variable of being a
minority in Afghanistan, this was an area that Kunz had
identified as being an "events alienated" refugee, which is
when due to past discrimination a refugee is embittered
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towards their former compatriots (Kunz 1981, pp. 42-43).
The hypothesis to be tested states,"The greater the
socio-cultural similarity with the home population the
greater the likelihood of repatriation."
The same data used to test cultural compatibility with
the Pakistanis will be used to test this hypothesis.
The only category that had more than one respondent was
the Tajiks who, while being a large group, are a minority
compared to the Pushtuns in size and power.
The one person who was willing to return under the
Russians was a Pushtun.
If the parties were fighting for power 22.9 percent
(N=19) of the Pushtuns were willing to return but none of
the Tajiks were.
If the mines still existed, 61.4 percent (N=51) of the
Pushtuns said they would not return, and 84.6 percent (N=ll)
of the Tajiks said they would not return.
The one person who was willing to return if there was
not an Islamic government was a Pushtun.
If the Shah returned Pushtuns and Tajiks were fairly
equal in the percent who said they would not return.
Tajiks had the one person who said he would not return
if there were no jobs.
The one real break in the pattern is if there are no
schools, the two people who said they would not return, were
Pushtuns.
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If there was a coalition government, eleven percent of
the Pushtuns said, "Yes, they would return," but no Tajiks
said, "Yes."
In comparing Pushtun and Tajik, the hypothesis stating,
"The greater the socio-cultural similarity with the home
population the less the likelihood of repatriation,"
supported by the data.

is

This would support the

identification by Kunz of the importance of selfidentif ication by the refugee (1981, pp. 42-43).
While no specific author has identified education as a
variable that impacts refugee.migrations, there are such
general issues raised by authors such as Everett

s.

Lee

(1966, pg. 56) in which he stated, "Migration is selective,"
and "positive selection is made for migrants of high
quality."
Education was chosen as one such indication of "high
quality"

When the education of the respondents was cross

tabbed with a willingness to return if the parties were
fighting for power, it was found that 68.4 percent (N=26) of
those with no education were not willing to return under
these conditions, compared to 100 percent (N=three) of those
with three-five years, 75 percent (N=six) of those with sixeight years education, 53.1 percent of those with nine-12
years and only 42.1 percent of those with 13-15 years or
more.

The most willing to return if the parties were

fighting are those with the most education.

When
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considering the question of mines, 78.9 percent (N=30) of
those without education said they would not return before
the removal of the mines, compared to 66.7 percent (N=two)
of those with three-five years of education, 75 percent
(N=six)of those with six-eight years, 59.4 percent (N=19) of
those with nine-12 years, and 42.1 percent (N=eight) of
those with 13-15 years and more.

Again the most willing to

return are those with the most education.

A rough

relationship appears to be that as education increases so
does willingness to return.
level of

education-~ncreases

It is possible that as the
the respondents either see more

opportunities for themselves or see more possible outcomes
to a situation.

CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSIONS
When drawing conclusions from the interview data, one
generality that can be drawn is that the Afghans as a group
either tend to have almost complete unanimity on an issue or
they have very diverse beliefs.
The hypothesis that states, "The obstacles to
repatriation will vary in relation to the original reasons
for flight," would be supported.

This would support the

concepts behind Bogue's (1969) and Lee's (1966) work, of
migration being the sum of "pluses" and "minuses" or "pulls"
and "pushes."

Just as continuation of the original factors

causing flight, the issues that arise in the intervening
years of refuge can also block repatriation.

For the

Afghans this includes the parties fighting for power, the
Shah returning, and the mines.

All of these can act as

minuses or pushes to keep the Afghans from desiring to
repatriate.

Simultaneously, the Afghans have established

communities, social and cultural ties and been economically
assimilated in Pakistan.

All of these acts as pulls or

pluses to remain in Pakistan.

This is an area that is

considerably underrated by the various governments and
agencies involved.

While it is undeniably crucial to remove
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or reduce the original causes of flight, the factors that
have arisen since can be just as important in blocking
repatriation.
The second hypothesis states, "The relationship between
age and probability of repatriation is curvilinear."
hypothesis would not be supported.

This

There are a few general

relationships evident, but they are not curvilinear.

For

the relationship between the parties fighting and age there
is a rough relationship indicating that as people got older
they were more and more willing to return if the parties
were fighting for power.

As far as the issue of the mines

goes the least willing to return if there still are mines
are the oldest.

These simple relationships I believe would

support the identification by Lee (1966) of age as being an
important factor.

As far as willingness to accept a non-

Islamic government, one general conclusion that can be drawn
is that the most willing to accept

non-Islamic government

are the youngest, those between 15-24.

In regard to

acceptance of the Shah, there is no clear relationship
between age and willingness to accept his return.

There

also does not appear to be any relationship between age and
willingness to return if there are no schools or no jobs.
The third hypothesis states that, "The concerns about
safety will vary with number of dependents."

This

hypothesis considered marital status, number of children,
and age of youngest child.

Safety in the context of flight
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and repatriation would be a minus or push blocking return if
an area was not safe.

If the parties were still fighting,

those most opposed to returning were those who were single,
next were those who were married and finally those who were
widowed.

This would not support this hypothesis.

Those who

were least willing to repatriate if the mines were not
removed were the widowers followed by those who were
married, and the most willing to return were those who were
single.

several things to be considered here, are that on

the one hand, the number of widowers is small (four total),
so they might not be reliable; on the other hand, they might
have concerns about other dependents which would make them
not want to return.

Comparing just single and married, this

hypothesis would be supported.

For the issue of marital

status, this hypothesis is supported under one condition but
not another.

This is an area that would certainly benefit

from further research.
The

issue of safety and number of children does not

show any clear relationship for number of children and
concern about returning under the Russians, while the
parties are fighting or if there are still mines present.
For this measure the hypothesis would not be supported.
When looking at the age of the youngest dependent and
willingness to return if there is fighting among the
parties, there is increasing willingness to return as the
age of the youngest child increases.

There is also a rough
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increase in willingness to return if there are mines as the
age of the youngest child increases.

This would support the

hypothesis that concerns about safety will vary with number
of dependents, which would support the identification by
Bogue (1969, pg. 754) 9f the importance of dependents.
The next hypothesis had to do with the effect of time
on willingness to repatriate.

This hypothesis states, "The

greater the time that a refugee has been out of the home
country the less likelihood of repatriation."

For the issue

of returning under the Russians no conclusion can be drawn.
When returning if the parties are fighting for power, no
relationship appears to exist, the same can be said about
returning if there are mines or a non-Islamic government.
It is not possible to tell if time in refuge has any affect
on willingness to return if there are no jobs or no schools
since all but a few people said they would return.
findings would not support this hypothesis.

These

When

considering the willingness to accept the Shah there is a
strong relationship.

The answers of the respondents

indicate that the longer they were in refuge the more
willing they are to accept the Shah.

When considering a

coalition government there was a rough trend for people to
be more willing to return under a coalition government the
longer they had been out of Afghanistan.

These

relationships would not support the hypothesis.

I believe

in fact that they indicate some other relationship.
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Tied to the issue of time is the hypothesis that states
that, "Over time, the general population will become more
concerned about pragmatic issues, while the ideological
leaders will shift towards more ideological concerns."
There does not appear to be any relationship if the parties
are fighting, if there are mines or there is not an Islamic
government.

This would not support the hypothesis.

If the

Shah returns, people are more willing to return the longer
they have been out of the country, which supports the
hypothesis for the general population.

Respondents'

willingness to return under a coalition government roughly
increased, which supports this hypothesis.

The few limited

respondents who voiced concern about jobs had all been in
refuge 5-10 years;, the two people who expressed concern
about schools had fled 3-6 years before.

While not enough

data were collected about leaders to draw any conclusions,
based on observations and conversations, leaders were more
concerned with ideological issues than were the everyday
people.

While these findings are very tentative, they

indicate that with further research these relationships
would support this hypothesis.
The next hypothesis has to do with the greater the
geographic distance the less the likelihood of repatriation.
The one person willing to return if the Russians were still
present was from Kabul (a province close to the border).

If

the parties were fighting, those from provinces far from the
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border were less willing to return.

They were also less

willing to return if there were mines present, if there was
a non-Islamic government, if there were not schools and if
there was a coalition government.
support this hypothesis.

Thus the data would

There was no relationship in

regard to where someone was from and willingness to return
under the Shah or if there were no jobs.

For this

hypothesis, there was such a small number of respondents
from provinces not close to the border that it is not
possifle to draw a reliable conclusion.

However it

indicates that there is a possibility that there is a
relationship which warrants further research.

I believe

that in general this does support Lee's (1966)
identification of the importance of intervening variables.
Hypothesis number seven says, "The greater the degree
of economic assimilation the less the likelihood of
repatriation."

There did appear to be slight relationship

between having a job in Pakistan and the willingness to
return if the parties were fighting, there were mines, or
the Shah returned.

This would support this hypothesis.

The

one person who said he would return under the Russians had
no job in Pakistan, and the two people who said they would
not return if there was no school had jobs in Pakistan.
These findings are so limited they cannot be relied on to
draw a general conclusion.

This hypothesis is supported in

some areas but not others.

This is an important finding
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since so much emphasis has been placed on the Afghans being
economic refugees.

A very common theme in Pakistan is that

the Afghans are there merely for jobs, this finding would
certainly dispute that the Afghans are in Pakistan only for
jobs.
The next hypothesis states, "The less the degree of
socio-cultural similarity with a host society the greater
the chance of repatriation."

To test this Tajiks and

Pushtuns were compared, both being in refuge in a Pushtun
area of Pakistan.

The one person willing to return under

the Soviets was a Pushtun, the Pusht4ns were more willing to
return if there was fighting between the parties, there were
mines, there was a non-Islamic government, or a coalition
government.

The two people who said they would not return

if there were no schools were Pushtun.

There was no

relationship in regards to returning under the Shah, or if
there were no jobs.

Overall this hypothesis would not be

supported by the data.
The next set of hypotheses have to do with personal
perceptions about Afghanistan.

The first personal

perception variable states that the greater the sociocultural similarity with the home population the greater the
likelihood of repatriation.

Again using the Pushtuns and

the Tajiks as a test of this, the Pushtuns are more willing
to return if the parties are fighting, there are mines,
there are no jobs and there is a coalition government, there
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is a limited relationship for the Pushtuns returning under
the Russians and under a non-Islamic government.

There was

no relationship in regards to the Shah, or returning if
there is no schools.

This hypothesis would be supported.

This would support Kunz's (1981) identification of the
importance of the refugees' identification with his or her
compatriots.
The second personal perception hypothesis states that,
"The greater the economic opportunities at home, the greater
the likelihood of repatriation."

The overwhelming

insistence of all but four respondents that they would
return home if there were no jobs in Afghanistan, would not
support this hypothesis.
The final hypothesis has to do with personal safety and
states that, "The less the fear about safety the greater the
chance for repatriation."

Based on the finding that the

majority of the people would not return if the Russians were
still present, the parties were fighting for power, or there
were mines present, this hypothesis would be supported as
well.

This would support both Bogue's (1969) and Kunz's

(1981) identification of war or threat to safety as an
important factor in causing flight.
When education was used as an independent variable,
increased levels of education were roughly associated with
an increasing willingness to return if the parties were
fighting for power or the mines had not been removed.
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If one were to construct a composite of a person that
would be least likely to return based on the data collected
during this thesis, it would be someone who still had the
reasons that drove him out of Afghanistan in the first
place, either very young or very old, married, have infant
children, have fled Afghanistan fairly recently, be part of
the general population (not a leader), be from a non border
province, not be economically assimilated in Pakistan, be a
minority (not a Pushtun), not have the personal safety
issues resolved and, have some (three to five years)
education.
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS ON THE AFGHAN REFUGEES
1.

The Afghan refugees are made up of political and

human rights refugees, who have become economic refugees in
the interim.
2.

There

returning.

probably

will

be

two

flows

or

vintages

Those who are political and human rights refugees,

and those who have become economic refugees.
3.

Economic refugees will be much slower in returning.

In the recent case of Haitian refugees, the political refugees
returned

immediately while most

of

the

economic

refugees

waited to see what would happen next.
4.

If economic problems are not dealt with, economic

refugees may return to their host country, as in the case of
Laotian refugees who fled into Thailand for economic reasons.
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Forcible repatriation will cause many to flee right back.

The

Afghans have expressed their belief that since the U.S. and
others helped extensively during the war they will provide
extensive aid to rebuild once people return.
5.

If civil war breaks out in Afghanistan,

there is

every reason to believe that refugees will not return or that
returnees will turn around and leave again in new flows.

Many

refugee flows in Africa are the direct result of civil war.
Uganda is an excellent example of this.

civil wars have

caused severe refugee problems in Burma, Laos, Lebanon, and
Nicaragua as well.
6.

If extensive aid continues, as has been suggested,

for the Afghans living in Pakistan, and if the Afghans are not
forcibly dragged to the border by the Pakistanis, and if civil
war breaks out and the Afghans are told not to return by rebel
leaders, few, if any appreciable number, will return.
7.

Repatriation can be forced through lack of aid. Such

was the case for Ugandans forced out of the Sudan and back
into Uganda; many returned even though fearing they might be
killed.

Refugees can be forcibly returned as the Laotians

were forced from Thailand.

Both of these refugee situations

saw many fleeing their home country again.
been mentioned by Pakistan,

This scenario has

other countries,

and NGO's for

forcing repatriation.
8.

One important issue for the Afghans is, naturally,

their cultural heritage.

The Afghans are extremely proud of
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their heritage and desire very strongly to return to their
homeland. At the same time, many of these people have been
nomadic or semi-nomadic and have crossed the Pakistani/Afghan
border numerous times in the past and will continue to do so
in the future.

So while returning may be very important, it

may not necessarily have to take place right away.
9.

A very

important consideration

is that,

despite

emphasis on what individuals will do and how they will decide
to return, the leaders will have a big impact on the decision
to return.

Of the respondents,

48 percent have said the

leader of the tribe will decide when they will return home.
10.

Another very important aspect of the Afghans' return

is that they have no set timetable for when they would return.
Only four respondents actually gave a time of possible return;
all others said something like, "When the Russians leave, and
the mines are gone and there is an Islamic government."
11.
years

or

Many of the Afghans have been refugees now for ten
longer.

Because of

the

time

involved,

a

high

proportion have been assimilated into the Pakistan and Iranian
economy and therefore will not return.
12.

To have repatriation occur, three different events

will have to take place.

First,

there will have to be a

political change in Afghanistan, such as the establishment of
an Islamic government.

Secondly,

civil wars must end and

safety issues such as the removal of mines must be dealt with
(based on data from 1988).

And finally, economic aid must be
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available to returnees for support and rebuilding.
13.

Even though it is a very simple finding, I believe

that the percent of respondents who say they will not return
under certain conditions is a reliable indicator of what the
population of refugees at large may feel.

According to the

respondents, 99 percent said they would not return before the
withdrawal of the Russians.

According to UNHCR workers and

NGO workers I spoke to in 1988, less than one percent of the
refugees had returned before the Soviet withdrawal.

The next

most important issue was whether refugees would return if
there was not an Islamic government,
they would not.
and

NGO

95 percent said,

"No"

According to conversations with UNHCR workers

workers,

who

Afghanistan in 1991,

had

returned

from

Pakistan

and

it was estimated that five percent or

less of the refugees had repatriated so far.

There are five

other issues about which varying amounts of people say they
will not return under certain circumstances. Rated from most
important to least important: 80 percent said they would not
return if there was a coalition government; 65 percent said
they would not return if the mines had not been removed; sixty
percent indicated they would not return if the parties were
fighting for power; if the Shah returns 44 percent said they
will not return; if there are no schools two percent said they
will not return; if there are no jobs one percent said they
will not return.

Because the number of respondents who said

they would not return before the withdrawal of the Russians
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and if there was not an Islamic government has closely matched
what has happened in the interim, I believe it indicates that
these

other

issues which

are

minuses

or pushes

blocking

repatriation may have a similar importance for the general
population of Afghan refugees.
PREDICTING RETURN
There are several different ways in which the process of
who will repatriate can be predicted.

One such way is to use

a Bogue type scheme and measure the "pushes" and "pulls" and
from their sum predict under what conditions people will
return (Bogue 1969, pp. 753-754).
To make predictions of possible outcomes of possible
repatriation, one needs to weigh the pushes or minuses against
the pluses or pulls to repatriate.

As has been stated

previously, pulls or pushes can come from home country as well
as host country.

Currently in Pakistan, the refugees enjoy

political refuge, they are physically safe, they receive aid
from

international

agencies,

the

majority

are

ethnically

similar to their hosts, both hosts and refugees are Moslem
(which is important to the Afghans), and some refugees are
able to find employment in the local economy.

Overall in

Pakistan, all factors operating are positive pulls to keep the
refugees

from returning home.

The economic situation in

Pakistan is best described as neutral;
work,

others do not.

some refugees find

Obviously at this point in time the
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pulls or pluses in Pakistan combined with the minuses or
pushes in Afghanistan are enough to keep 95 percent of the
refugees from returning.
a

standstill.

currently this system is almost at

One option would be to turn the pluses or

positive factors in Pakistan into negative ones: humanitarian
aid could be cut off, all refugee work could be stopped, and
the refugees could be forcibly rounded up at gunpoint and
driven to the border and forced across.

Forced return, or

refoulment, has been denounced by the UNHCR as both being in
violation of a refugees' rights as well as being a non-viable
alternative since it is usually not a durable solution, but
one that results in subsequent refugee flight.

Recognizing

this, one can rate the importance of the factors holding the
Afghans in Pakistan,

but for solutions one must change the

factors acting as pushes or minuses in Afghanistan which block
return.
Based on responses given by the refugees interviewed, one
can estimate percentages of returnees.

The ranges listed are

derived from the factor which will cause the highest rates of
non-return and the next highest factor below it, then each
successive factor below that.

The situation that currently

exists is a negative scenario where between 80 percent and 65
percent will not return.

The high rate of non-return will

occur if a coalition government or what is perceived as a
coalition government is formed, the mines are not removed, and
other negative factors remain in place.

If there is not a
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coalition government,

but the mines are

in place and the

parties are fighting between 65 percent and 60 percent will
not return.

If the mines have been removed, but the parties

are fighting and the Shah returns, between 60 percent and 44
percent will not return.

If the parties are not fighting but

the Shah returns and there are no schools, between 44 percent
and two percent will not return.

If the Shah does not return,

but there are no schools and no jobs between two and one
percent will not return.

Even if all negative factors which

currently block return are removed, due to the large amount of
time passing while the Afghans have been in refuge and the
accompanying economic and cultural assimilation, it is very
possible

that

between

ten

and

15

percent

will

never

repatriate.
While
officer.

in Peshawar

I

met with Llyod

Deacon,

a

UNHCR

Based on his knowledge of the situation he said the

refugees would return in three stages.
farmers living in the refugee camps.

First would be the

They would go to areas

controlled by the Mujahideen and that had been cleared of
mines.

Secondly, the small time merchants and city dwellers

who had been living in the city would go.

Last to go will be

the big merchants or successful businessmen who have a lot of
cash.

The last group may wait as long as two or three years

until they are guaranteed security.

Deacon also said that

current programs in Afghanistan (in 1988)

were geared towards

getting farmers to return first; once the farmers are in place
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hopefully it would draw other refugees back (based on field
notes of conversation with Llyod Deacon, November 1988).
Writers such as William Wood, believe that return will be
based, first, on the determination of the tribal leaders and
Mujahideen leaders of when it is safe to go back.

Secondly,

the border provinces will receive the first returnees, who
will be men who return several months or weeks before their
families,

to repair homes and fields.

This will then be

followed thirdly by a slower, more organizeq migration (Wood
1989).
Finally it should be noted that I have just received a
letter,

dated May 4,

1992,

(following the collapse of the

communist regime in Kabul) from one of the Afghans who worked
as my assistant and he says, "My family will leave as soon as
the peace gets stability in the country, however those who
used to

live

in the

cities have

already

started moving,

because their houses are intact" (personal letter from Afghan
refugee) .
THEORETICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE AFGHAN REFUGEES
Based on the work of the authors cited in this thesis, to
summarize the Afghan refugee situation one would best start
with the work of Bogue or Lee.

The Afghans were pushed out

of their country by "minuses" (Lee 1966, pg. 50) or "pushes"
(Bogue 1969, pp. 753-754).

The Afghans are a "Reactive Fate

Group" in that they are refugees of war or revolutionary
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changes (Kunz 1981, pg. 44).

The Afghan refugees would also

be considered "The Majority Identified" in that they believe

that their opposition to the situation is shared by the
majority of their compatriots (Kunz 1981, pp. 42-43).

The

Afghans were pushed out by "home related factors" (Lee 1966,
pg. 50, Kunz 1981, pp. 42-46).

Other than the war, the

other home related factors include: the political situation
in the home country (Akel 1987, pg. 156) and ethnic and
religious conflict (Bogue 1969, pp. 753-754).

In the

interim the Afghans have become economic refugees as well.
The Afghans overcame the "intervening obstacle" of geography
(Lee 1966, pg. 50).

The Afghans have been "pulled" to the

host country of Pakistan by host related factors (Lee 1966,
pg. 50, Kunz 1981, pp. 46-49).

The "pulls" include

"preferable environment and living conditions and dependency
of persons to whom one is related" (Bogue 1969, pg. 754).
If one considers Kunz's "host related factors," the Afghans
and Pakistanis share the same language (in the Northwest
Frontier Province), they both have similar values, both
Afghans and Pakistanis have similar traditions, share the
same religion (Islam), the Pakistanis have an Islamic
government, the Afghans want one, they eat similar types of
food and have similar interpersonal relations (Kunz 1981,
pg. 47).

In fact Pakistan as a host country is culturally

compatible (generally) in all the areas that Kunz
identified.
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MODEL OF FLOW
The best general description that can be made about the
Afghan
flights,

flight

and possible

repatriation,

and

all

refugee

is that it is a process or cycle encompassing two

countries and the interplay of factors or "pushes" and "pulls"
between them (Bogue 1969, pp. 753-754).
A good analogy to use here is that the process is similar
to the cycle a motor goes through.

Refugees are pushed out of

their country and pulled to a host country.

The Afghans were

pushed out initially or in the interim by all four spheres:
political, human rights, economic and socio-cultural.

They

have overcome the geographic obstacles and were pulled to
Pakistan by the socio-cultural sphere, the human rights sphere
and the political

sphere.

considered neutral.

The

economic

sphere would be

Since their arrival, time has become an

intervening obstacle.

To repatriate,

the pulls home must

overcome the pulls to remain in a host country (Bogue 1969),
in this

case Pakistan.

While the political situation or

sphere has improved in Afghanistan it is still far from ideal.
The same can be said about the socio-cultural and human rights
sphere.

Finally, the economic sphere continues to be very

negative or to push

refugees away.

Like a gasoline engine

this process or cycle can run very badly or inefficiently,
with

pulls

barely

overcoming pushes,

or

it

can run very

efficiently with pulls for movement very strong and the pushes
blocking movement,

non-existent or weak.

A system running
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with high efficiency (lots of pluses and low or no minuses)
would have high levels of returnees.

A system running with

low efficiency (lots of minuses and few pluses) would have low
or no rates of returnees.

To apply the analogy to the

Afghans, one would have to say that at this point, the motor
(or cycle) is running at low efficiency, because the pushes
blocking return and the pulls from the host country are still
stronger than the pulls to return home, to Afghanistan.
(See Figure 5., Refugee Flight and Repatriation Flow Model.)
FURTHER RESEARCH THAT IS NEEDED
In general all of the topics covered in this research
project would benefit from further research covering a
greater sample.

Over time a number of the issues and

scenarios described within the work will come to pass, so
continued longitudinal research would be beneficial as well
to see if the amounts of returnees match the responses of
the sample.
Specific areas that seemed to be important, but had few
respondents, or not enough data collected about them and
hence have questionable reliability, were the issues of why
people left, ethnic differences, gender differences,
differences in those from different geographic locations,
and effect of dependents on willingness to repatriate.

All

of these areas would benefit from a larger sample and more
in-depth research.
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One area that would have been beneficial to pursue
would have been to study the group decision making processes
and how they differ among various tribal groups and other
forms of leadership, both among the Afghans as well as
refugees around the world.
Another area that would have been fascinating to pursue
would have been a longitudinal study of what specific
respondents said they would do and what they in fact later
did do.

This would allow a correlation between intention

and actual behavior to be measured ..
Most

i~portant

of all would be to conduct more research

on other refugee populations to determine what is unique and
specific to the Afghans and what are universal factors and
issues affecting all refugees.
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APPENDIX
Questionnaire used in interviewing Afghan refugee subjects;
1. Age
2. Ethnic Group /Tribe
3. Marital status
4. Number of Children and ages
5. Home town and village or province
6. How many years of education have you had?

7. What are your reasons for leaving Afghanistan?
8. When did you leave Afghanistan?
9. Do you live in a refugee camp? if not where?
10. Do you work here in Pakistan?
11. What was your job in Afghanistan?
12. Is your family here with you?
13.

Will you return to Afghanistan before the Soviet

withdrawal?
14. Will you return if the Mujahideen and the parties are
fighting for power?
15. Will you return before the removal of the mines.
16. Will you return if there is not an Islamic government.
17. Which party do you belong to?
18. Which party should run the government?
19. Would you return if King Zahir Shah ran the government?
20. Will you return if there are no jobs in Afghanistan?
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21. Will you return if there are no schools?
22. How important is religious freedom for you to return?
23. How will you return to Afghanistan?
24. Do you think the rich Afghan will return to Afghanistan?
25. Do you think the student in the university will stay here
to finish their studies?
26. Do you know anyone who will stay here?
27. If someone stayed in Pakistan what would their family do.
28. When the refugees go back what will they need to survive?
29. How have the Pakistanis helped the refugees?
29a What help have other countries given.
30. Will the Pakistanis continue to help when the refugees
return home?
31. With all of the Afghans heavily armed will there be a
problem with violence when everyone goes home.
32. When will you and the other refugees return?
33. Would you return if there was a coalition government with
the communists?
34.

What will people do about roof poles and building

material when they return home?
35.

Are there any other important issues I

have not asked

about ?
36. What will you take back with you?
37. What will your tribe do will they all go back together?
38.

Who will decide when it is time for your tribe to go

back?
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39. What job will you do when you return?

40. Will Pakistan ever force the refugees to leave?
41. Does your family feel the same way about these issues?

